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Case: CV-PC-2010-21310 Current Judge: Deborah Bail
Jeffrey Murray, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Jeffrey Murray, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

10/27/2010

NCPC

CCLATICJ

New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief

District Court Clerk

PETN

CCNELSRF

Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief

District Court Clerk

CERT

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Mailing

District Court Clerk

PROS

PRPETZDN

Prosecutor assigned Tessie Buttram

District Court Clerk

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order for Transcripts

Deborah Bail

11/8/2010

RQST

CCKINGAJ

Request for Judicial Notice

Deborah Bail

11/17/2010

TRAN

DCTHERTL

Transcript Filed

Deborah Bail

11/22/2010

ANSW

CCMASTLW

Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Deborah Bail

11/30/2010

OBJC

CCSWEECE

Objection To State's Request For Dismissal

Deborah Bail

1/24/2011

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Motion for Summary Disposition

Deborah Bail

MEMO

CCBOYIDR

Memorandum in Support of Petitioners Motion for Deborah Bail
Summary Disposition

2/9/2011

RSPS

CCRANDJD

Response to Motion for Summary Disposition

Deborah Bail

2/16/2011

RPLY

CCDWONCP

Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion
for Summary Disposition

Deborah Bail

41712011
417/2011

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for Order Case to Mediation or Set
Hearing on Petitioners Motion for Summary
Disposition

Deborah Bail

4/11/2011

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (05/31/11 @ 9:30am)

Deborah Bail

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/31/2011 09:30 AM) Post Conviction Relief

Deborah Bail

DCTHERTL

Order to Transport (5/31/11 @ 9:30 am)

Deborah Bail

10/29/2010

4/1212011
4/12/2011

Judge

5/3112011
5/31/2011

DCHH

CCTHERTL

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Deborah Bail
05/31/2011 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Helc
He/c
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 150
Post Conviction Relief

10/20/2011

DEOP

CCTHERTL

Decision

Deborah Bail

CERT

CCTHERTL

Certificate Of Mailing

Deborah Bail

CDIS

CCTHERTL

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,
Deborah Bail
Other Party; Murray, Jeffrey, Subject. Filing date:
10/20/2011

STAT

CCTHERTL

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Deborah Bail

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Deborah Bail

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For The Appointment Of The State
Appellate Public Defender And To Proceed In
Forma Pauperis

Deborah Bail

1/9/2012

NOTC

CCHEAT.IL

Notice Of Filing Application For Public Defender

Deborah Bail

1/18/2012

OR
DR
ORDR

CCTHERTL

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Deborah Bail
and Allowing Petitioner to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis

3/15/2012

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 39400

11/18/2011

Deborah Bail
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

;~- -'W;i/:2!E
ocr 27 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By OARlY LA"'MOPl8
oepuTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Cv ,Pc. 1021 31 0 f

CASE NO.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POSTPOST
CONVICTION RELIEF

)

Comes now Jeffrey Murray being duly sworn upon oath states as follows.
I. INTRODUCTION:

I. I am the petitioner in this case.
1.
2. I was charged in 2009 by amended information with the offenses of attempted
strangulation and battery.
3. The Ada County Number for that case is CRFE-2009-61 02.
4. Attorney Jared Martens represented me.
5. I pleaded guilty to a charge of felony domestic battery, in violation of I.C. § 18-918.
6. This plea was made pursuant to an agreement between the parties.
7. The agreement was that a ten-year sentence with three years fixed should be imposed
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but suspended and that I should be placed on probation. One of the conditions of probation was
that I would serve 120 days in jail.
8. Mr. Martens told me that I would not get more than 120 days.
9. I was sentenced on September 8, 2009.
10. The Court did not follow the plea agreement. It imposed a ten-year sentence with
three years fixed and did not suspend the sentence.
11. The judgment and sentence was filed on September 15,2009.
12. On September 24,2009, Attorney Joe Ellsworth appeared as counsel in place of
Jared Martens.
13. The time to file a Notice of Appeal expired on October 27,2009.
14. No Notice of Appeal was filed.
15. On December 8, 2009, Mr. Ellsworth filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
sentence and a memorandum in support on my behalf.
16. On January 29,2010, an Order denying the Rule 35 motion was filed.
17. A Notice of Appeal was filed from the order denying the Rule 35 motion.
18. That appeal is still pending.
19. With respect to this conviction, I have not filed any other petitions for postconviction relief.
II. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
THE PLEA OF GUILTY W
AS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
WAS
KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY.

20. I was not aware at the time I entered the guilty plea that the Court did not have to
follow the terms of the plea agreement.
2·
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21. Had I known the Court did not have to follow the tenns of the plea agreement, I
would not have pleaded guilty.
22. Mr. Martens did not tell me that the Court did not have to follow the tenns of the
plea agreement.
23. The Court did not tell me that it did not have to follow the tenns of the plea
agreement.
24. A true and correct copy of the transcript of the guilty plea and sentencing hearings is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
25. The Court's guilty plea questionnaire did not infonn me that the Court was not
required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement.
ifI understood
26. Paragraph 11 of the Court's guilty plea questionnaire, which asked if!
that the Court is not required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement, did not require me to
circle either "Yes" or "No."
27. A true and correct copy of the guilty plea questionnaire is attached hereto as Exhibit
B.

28. I did not respond to this portion of the guilty plea questionnaire because I believed
that the Court was required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement.
29. Mr. Martens specifically told me that paragraph 11 did not apply to me because I was
only to be sentenced to 120 days.

3·

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
POST -CONVICTION RELIEF

000005

•

•

III. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
COUNSEL AT THE PLEA AND SENTENCING HEARINGS WAS
CONSTITUTIONALL Y INEFFECTIVE.
CONSTITUTIONALLY
Allel:ations ret:ardint:
rel:ardinl: ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea hearint:.
hearinl:.
A. Allet:ations
30. I reallege the facts set forth in Paragraphs 1-29 above.
31. The guilty plea questionnaire infonned me that I was waiving my rights under "State

v. Estrada."
32. Mr. Martens never explained to me what rights I had under "State v. Estrada."
33. At the guilty plea hearing, the Court ordered that a domestic violence evaluation be
done and submitted to the Court.
34. Mr. Martens never explained to me that I had a right to obtain my own domestic
violence evaluation which would not be released to the Court without my pennission.

35. Had I been so infonned, I would have obtained my own confidential domestic
violence evaluation prior to entering a plea of guilty.
36. I only agreed to waive my rights under "State v. Estrada" because I thought that I
could not get more than 120 days ofjail.
of jail.
37. Mr. Martens should not have allowed me to submit to a non-confidential domestic
violence evaluation prior to sentencing because he could not have known what the results of that
evaluation would be.
38. I submitted to the court-ordered evaluation because I believed I was required to do
so.
39. The court-ordered evaluation was unfavorable to me.
40. The court-ordered evaluation reached its conclusions based upon misunderstandings

4·
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of the facts.
41. Mr. Martens was in possession of the court-ordered evaluation prior to sentencing.
42. Mr. Martens did not go over the court-ordered evaluation with me prior to
sentencing.
43. Mr. Martens did not contact Mr. Wilson or take any actions to try to correct those
factual misunderstandings in the court-ordered evaluations
44. Mr. Martens did not inform me that I could get my own evaluation to rebut the
findings in the court-ordered evaluation.
45. In November of2008, I was evaluated by William Pittman, Ph.D., in connection with
my claim for Social Security Disability benefits.
46. While Mr. Wilson suggested that I have Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Dr.
Pittman did not find an Axis I diagnosis
47. Dr. Pittman did find I have Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder.
48. I did not believe an additional evaluation was needed because I believed that the
Court was bound to follow the plea agreement.
49. Had I known the Court was not bound by the plea agreement, I would have obtained
another evaluation to challenge the conclusions in the court-ordered evaluation.
50. Mr. Martens did not go over the Presentence Investigation Report with me until the
morning of sentencing.
51. I was given the PSI only shortly before the sentencing hearing and did not have
enough time to review it prior to sentencing.
52. Mr. Martens did not inform me that I could seek a continuance of the sentencing
5·
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hearing so I could go over the PSI with him.
53. The PSI contained damaging statements made by my wife which were untrue.
54. Mr. Martens did not attempt to disprove these false statements.
55. Mr. Martens did not attempt to question the credibility of these statements.
56. At the time of the sentencing, my wife had been charged with domestic assault
against her boyfriend Greg Evans for throwing things at him and threatening him with a tire iron.
[This charge was later dismissed.]
57. Further, my wife was charged in August of2009 with aggravated assault for
threatening her boyfriend's mother with a kitchen knife. [This charge is pending.]
58. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Complaint
against my wife on the domestic assault charge. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Complaint against my wife on the aggravated assault charge.
59. Mr. Martens did not alert the Court to these pending charges.
60. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of an article which ran in the
October 9,2010 on-line edition of the Jackson Sun. It notes that my wife killed her boyfriend in
July 2010 by stabbing him with a kitchen knife, but was not indicted. Moreover, it also notes the
charges listed in ,-r 56 and 57 above and that the prosecutor intends to resubmit the murder charge
to the grand jury.
61. That Mr. Martens did not inform the Court that it was mistaken about important facts
during sentencing. In particular,
61.1. The Court stated that I had engaged in "prior incidents of domestic
violence" and "stalking behavior of other girlfriends or significant others."
Sentencing Transcript, pg. 33, In. 8-12. Neither of these statements are true. My
6·
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wife made these accusations to the police but later recanted.
61.2. My wife told the police that the photographs the Court thought showed
domestic violence actually showed consensual behavior.
61.3. There is nothing in the PSI that I stalked other girlfriends or significant
others. There is a report that Dorinda Balonis accused me of breaking her porch
light, but the police officer who took the report did not file charges noting that
Ms. Balonis was highly intoxicated and had no proof to support her accusation.
61.4. The Court mentions four times during the sentencing that I have "violated
past protection order§." Sentencing Transcript, pg. 36, In. 3; pg. 35, In. 13-15 and
23 (emphasis added). While it is true that I have one conviction for violating a
protection order, there are no other instances.
61.5. The Court mentions that I have engaged in sadistic sexual behavior with
multiple partners and that there is a pattern of "extreme sadistic behavior towards
partners." But there is no reliable evidence of that as those accusations only come
from the uncorroborated statements of my estranged wife who is currently facing
a murder charge.
62. Had Mr. Martens been adequately prepared for the sentencing hearing, the Court
would have followed the plea agreement.
B. Allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel post-sentencing

63. I did not learn that the Court was not required to follow the terms of the plea
agreement until after the sentencing hearing.
64. When Mr. Martens informed me that the Court was not required to follow the terms
of the plea agreement, I told him that I did not understand that when I entered my guilty plea.
65. Mr. Martens never informed me that I could ask the Court for permission to
withdraw my guilty plea.
66. Had Mr. Martens so informed me, I would have asked the Court for permission to
withdraw my guilty plea.

7·
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67. Mr. Martens did not inform me that I had the right to appeal the sentence imposed.
68. Had I known I could have appealed the sentence imposed I would have done so.

IV. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
COUNSEL AT POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE.
69. I reallege the matters set forth in Paragraphs 1-68 above.
70. Mr. Ellsworth became my counsel nine days after the judgment and sentence was
filed.
71. Before Mr. Ellsworth filed his appearance in my case, I told him that I did not know
at the time of the guilty plea that the Court was not required to follow the terms of the plea
agreement.
72. Mr. Ellsworth never informed me that I could ask the Court for permission to
withdraw my guilty plea.
73. Had Mr. Ellsworth so informed me, I would have asked the Court for permission to
withdraw my guilty plea.
74. I had 42 days after the judgment and sentence was filed in which to file an I.c.R. 33
motion to withdraw my guilty plea.
75. Mr. Ellsworth did not file a motion to withdraw guilty plea on my behalf.
76. Mr. Ellsworth also did not inform me that I could appeal the sentence imposed.
77. Had Mr. Ellsworth so informed me, I would have asked him to appeal the sentence.
78. Mr. Ellsworth did not inform me that I could obtain another evaluation in order
to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation and support my Rule 35 motion.
79. Had I known I could obtain another evaluation, I would have obtained one.
8·
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80. Mr. Ellsworth did not attempt to disprove the false statements made against me in the
Rule 35 Motion.
81. Had he done so, he would have found evidence which would have demonstrated the
unreliability of my wife's testimony as set forth in ~~ 56-60 above.
82. That Mr. Ellsworth did not inform the Court that it was mistaken about important
facts during sentencing as set forth in ~ 61 above.
83. Had Mr. Ellsworth adequately prepared the Rule 35 motion and supported it with
reasonable available information, the Court would have granted the Rule 35 and followed the
plea agreement.

V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief:
A. That my guilty plea be vacated or, alternatively,

B. That judgment be withheld and I be placed on probation or, alternatively,
C. That my sentence be modified to a sentence of ten years with three years fixed, with
that sentence being suspended and me being placed on probation or alternatively,
D. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this:2.1-r;t:y
this::L1-r;t:y of October, 2010.

~~~--"=Y'--~=
~~~~4Cr-O-=
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
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VERlFICATION OF PETITION
I, Jeffrey Murray, being duly sworn under oath, state:

I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and that the

m,tt", 'nd ,1I,g,hon,,~
'lI,g,hon"~ forth ",1m, "d
",d :~fmY
:~fmY know''''g' "d
ond b,hot
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
copy of the foregoing document to be

th~~ of October, 2010, I caused a true and correct

X mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., #3191
Boise, ill
ID 83702

~LA'''' ;;:: ., 0--..'
Deii""nis Benj amin
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2
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3

STATE OF IDAHO,
4

Plaintiff-Respondent,
5

vs.
6
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,

7

Defendant-Appellant.
8

---------------

x

9

10
Appealed from the District Court of the
11

Fourth Judicial District of the State of
12
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
13

Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge.
14
15
16

IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
Boise, Idaho
Attorneys for Appellant
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General, State of Idaho
Boise, Idaho
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

2
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3

STATE OF IDAHO,
4

Plaintiff-Respondent,
5

vs.
6

JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
7

Defendant-Appellant.
8

----------------

x

9

10
11
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12
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2
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3

4

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Case No. CR-FE-2009-6102

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

5

6
7
8
9

vs.
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
Defendant.

-------------------x

10
11

12
13

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

14

Held on July 13, 2009 & September 8, 2009, before

15
Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge.

16
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20
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23
24
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Susan G. Ganbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County,ldaho
3 of 14 sheets

000016
page 3 to 3 of 39

J
State of Idaho vs. Jeffrey
Dane Murr

Case No. CR-FE·2009-6102
CR-FE-2009-6102

4
1

A P PEA RAN C E S

2

3

4
5

FOR THE STATE
TESSIE A. BUTTRAM
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
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Martens Law Office
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Boise, Idaho 83702
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Case No. CR·FE·2009-6102

7, •

6
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25

BOISE, IDAHO
Monday, July 13, 2009, 9:30 a.m.
mE COURT: State versus Jeffrey Murray.
MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, could I talk to
Uttle bit on this, and then we
the prosecutor one little
will be ready on this, I think?
mE COURT: Sure.
(Brief delay.)
mE COURT: Let's resume with this case,
State versus Murray. What's going on?
MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, I have been
working with the prosecutor on this, and I think
we have come up with an agreement that will work
for Mr. Murray, and that would be .-- I've got an
amended complaint here, if you don't have it.
MS. BUTTRAM: I hadn't provided it to the
court yet. I wasn't sure it was going to happen,
but I'm providing the court with a Second Amended
Information, Your Honor, amended from felony
attempted strangulation domestic battery to one
count of felony domestic violence.
mE COURT: Then what's the rest of the
agreement?
MR. MARTENS: The rest of the agreement is

1
2
3
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that he would stipulate to the elements of
household member and traumatic injury, marks on
the neck, he will waive his right to appeal on
those two elements.
The State would cap its recommendation
at three plus seven, 120 days Ada County Jail, no
contact with the victim, need to get a domestic
violence and alcohol evaluation. Restitution and
court costs are open.
The defense is free to argue for less.
And in talking to the prosecutor, if he meets the
requirements, they are not going to promote but
not object to a withheld judgment in this case.
THE COURT: So he would plead guilty to the
charge in the Second Amended Information, and the
State will ask for three years fixed, followed by
seven years indeterminate, for a ten-year
sentence, suspended, up to 120 days Ada County
Jail, would get a domestic violence evaluation and
alcohol evaluation, and the State might not oppose
a withheld.
MS. BUTIRAM: Yes, Your Honor. Restitution
is open, asking for court costs, and a no-contact
order as well.
THE COURT: Okay, is there an Estrada

9

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

24

waiver?
MS. BUTTRAM: I believe so.
THE
mE COURT: Well, I think there would have
to be. I'm not going to take it without an
Estrada \vaiver.
MR. MARTENS: Just a moment, let me talk to
the prosecutor.
(Brief delay.)
MR. MARTENS: Yes, that's fine. He will
waive, Your Honor.
THE COURT: .Is that what you want to do,
Mr. Murray?
mE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE
THE COURT: Is there anything else you are
expecting I didn't hear about?
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.
THE COURT: Okay. And so you do want to
plead guilty under these terms today?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, ma'am.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Have you seen the Second Amended
Information?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Do you need me to read it to

25

you?
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MR. MARTENS: He has read it, Your Honor. I
believe we would waive.
THE COURT: You don't want me to read it to
you? You don't need that?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you understand the charge?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Do you consent to the filing of
the Second Amended Information?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Well, do you have a
guilty plea advisory form to submit to the court,
then?
MR. MARTENS: We have not done that. We
have just been working it out.
THE COURT: We will take a ten-minute
recess, or 15 -let's take a lS-minute recess.
If you need more time, let me know, and we will
just go through that.
MR. MARTENS: Okay.
THE COURT: You should layout the terms in
that as well.
(Recess taken.)
THE COURT: Are you done there, counsel?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor.

Susan G. Ganbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho
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THE COURT: If you will hand that form to
the bailiff, he will hand it to me.
(Both complied.)
mE COURT: All right. So, counsel, did you
get all the discovery in this case?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor.
mE COURT: Have you reviewed it with your
client?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, we have.
mE COURT: Did you ad vise him of his rights
and defenses?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor.
mE COURT: And he is aware of the
consequences of a guilty plea?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor.
mE COURT: And you went over the guilty
plea advisory form with him?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, we just did.
mE COURT: Any problems or questions?
MR. MARTENS: No, no, I answered any that he
had.
mE COURT: Okay, and that's your signature
on the last page?
MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor.
mE COURT: An reason wh we shouldn't 0
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12
Q. And you know what you were charged with

forward?
MR. MARTENS: No, Your Honor.
mE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Murray, if you will stand, the
clerk is going to swear you in.
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
the defendant herein, having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
EXAMINAnON
BY mE COURT:
Q. Go ahead and say your full name for the
record ..
record..
A. Jeffrey Dane Murray.
Q. And, Mr. Murray, you do have a high
school degree and some college?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. What do you do to make a living?
A. Last 20 years I worked in Illinois, and
I broke my back, and I'm on Social Security
disability now.
Q. Now, you understand what you are
charged with in the Second Amended Information?
A. Yes, ma'am.

13

are aware of that?
2 originally?
A. Yes, ma'am.
2
A. Yes, ma'am.
3
3
Q. Are you on probation or parole?
4
Q. And you know what the maximum penalty
4
A. No, ma'am.
5 for each offense is?
5
Q. Did you make confessions or admissions
A. Yes, ma'am.
6
6 to the police in this case?
Q. Has anybody promised you that I would
7
7
A. Just one.
8 be easy on you if you would plead guilty?
8
Q. You talked to the police about what
9
A. No, ma'am.
9 happened?
10
Q. Has anybody intimidated you or
10
A. Yes, ma'am.
11 threatened you to make you plead guilty?
11
Q. Did you do that freely and voluntarily?
12
A. No, ma'am.
12
A. Yes, ma'am.
13
Q. Has anyone offered you a reward or
13
Q. Are you addicted or accustomed to the
14 incentive to plead guilty?
14 use of alcohol or drugs?
15
A. No, ma'am.
15
A. No, ma'am. I was on medication up
16
Q. Are you pleading guilty even though you
16 until last month when I came out here, and I have
17 think you are innocent?
17 gotten off it, just work it out, that type thing.
18
A. No, ma'am.
18
Q. SO you are not under the influence of
19
Q. Now, the way it works is, if I take
19 anything at all today?
20 your guilty plea, I will be ordering a presentence
20
A. No, ma'am.
21 report, and that would give me lots of information
psychological or mental problems
21
Q. Any psycholOgical
22 about your background.
22 that might have some bearing on the case?
23
It would also give me information about
23
A. I just have anxiety and am being
24 any past record. A past record is a major factor
24 treated for that.
25 in decidin what the sentence ou ht to be. You
25
Q. Are ou havin an trouble
000020
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uhderstanding
understanding what's going on today?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Have you had any trouble understanding
your lawyer?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. SO when did you decide to plead guilty?
gUilty?
A. Today, I suppose.
MR. MARTENS: We have been talking about it
for a while, but we have been working on a plea
agreement. We just got it finalized today, so
today.
Q. BY THE COURT: So you have been
thinking about it for a while?
A. Yes, ma'am,
ma'atn, just families and stuff,
but didn't want no problem.
Q. Now, have you had enough time to think
about it?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Have you had enough time to talk to
your lawyer?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Now, when you talked to him, did you
tell him what happened?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Did he tell ou to our satisfaction
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Q. Now, you understand once I take your
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what your rights and defenses are?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And he did talk to you about the
consequences of a guilty plea?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Are you satisfied with his
representation?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Are there any witnesses that you wanted
him to talk to that he has not talked to?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Is there anything else that you wanted
him to do that he has not done?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Okay, now, you do realize that you are
giving up your constitutional right to trial by
jury, confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against you, and you are giving up the privilege
against self-incrimination?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And you understand also that you are
giving up your legal and factual defenses; you
will be saying the charge is true if you plead
guilty?
Y ma'am.
A. Yes,

17

tend to show you committed some other crime?
guilty plea to the charge in the Second Amended
You need to talk freely and openly with
Information, you will not be able to change your
the presentence investigator and with any domestic
mind and plead not guilty?
gUilty?
4 violence evaluator about any problems that you
A. Yes. ma'am.
5 might have that might have a bearing upon
Q. Okay. And this is a felony. If you
6 sentencing.
keep putting felonies on your record, you could
7
A. Yes, ma'am.
set yourself up to be charged some day as a
8
Q. And you are aware of that?
persistent violator or habitual offender.
A. Yes, ma'am.
9
It does not happen now. It's something
10
Q. Okay. Now, did you have any problems
that happens when people keep putting felonies on
11 understanding questions on the guilty plea
their record.
12 advisory form?
A. Yes, ma'am.
13
A. No, ma'am.
Q. It's Significant, because what it means
14
Q. Did you answer those questions
is, a person can get a longer sentence because -15 honestly?
-
they increase the felonies because of the prior
16
A. Yes, ma'am.
felonies.
17
Q. And did you answer all the questions
A. Yes, ma'am.
18 freely and voluntarily?
Q. Now, you went over the guilty plea
19
A. Yes, ma'am.
advisory form with your lawyer?
20
Q. SO it's your decision to plead guilty
A. Yes, ma'am.
21 in this case?
Q. And you understand you are giving up
22
A. Yes, ma'am.
your rights under State versus Estrada, and that
23
Q. Okay, I'm just going to take a look at
means that you cannot refuse to answer any
24 all this. And are you preserving some rights for
25 a eal?
uestion or rovide an information that mi htt
Susan G. Gcmbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho
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MR. MARTENS: I think that he's still free
to appeal the court's decision, but he simply is
not -- he can't appeal those based upon those two
elements.
TIlE COURT: What decision? You mean the
sentencing decision?
MR. MARTENS: Right.
TIlE COURT: That's not a problem. So just
the sentence, then?
MR. MARTENS: Yes.
TIlE COURT: Okay. Because I don't consider
that truly a conditional plea, so that's why I'm
clarifying that.
TIlE WITNESS: Okay.
Q. BY THE COURT: Well, anything else?
Any questions you have before you want to go
forward?
A. No, ma'am. It's been covered.
Q. Okay, then, so what happened? Why is
this charge true?
A. The young lady that I was breaking up
with, I was going to move back to Tennessee, and
she didn't want me to leave, and she became
irritated with me. And at some point I held her,
initated
I suppose, by the neck, arm, some seconds.
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Q. Did this happen on April3rd, 2009?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q. Was it in Ada County?

A.

Yes, ma'am.
Q. And you and Nicole Steffler were
household members at that time?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. SO you grabbed her neck and squeezed
it?
A. (No audible response.)
Q. What happened?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. SO you did commit a battery on her,
that is, an unlawful touching?
A. To hold her back and get her stopped.
Q. SO is this charge in the Second Amended
Information true?
ma'am.
A. Yes, ma'am..
THE COURT: Counsel, your version?
MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, the information
the State has, the defendant and Nicole Steffler
had been dating approximately six months.
They, at a portion in their time in the
relationship, lived together, but at the time this
ha ened, the weren't residin in the same lace,

21
2

but they were staying together overnight at this
1 and it looks to me like it's freely and
hotel where this incident occurred. The defendant
2 voluntarily made, so I will accept your plea, and
and the victim had gotten into an argument over
3 I will have the clerk enter it.
4
seeing other people.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
5
The victim did say that she had pushed
5
THE COURT: I'm going to set a time for
6 disposition. I would like to set August 24th at 3,
6 him, hit him in order to get him away from her,
7 and then she reported he grabbed her by the neck,
7 if that's available for counsel.
8 squeezed her neck for five to ten seconds.
8
MR. MARTENS: August 24th at 3 would be
On the 1 to 7, a 7 on the pain scale
9 fine, Your Honor.
9
10 caused difficult breathing, caused swelling to her
10
THE COURT: I'm going to order a domestic
11 neck, which turned into wheezing. This did happen
11 violence evaluation from Tom Wilson. You will
12 here in Ada County State ofIdaho.
12 need to take care of that as soon as possible.
13
Q. BY THE COURT: So you are conceding the 13 The condition of your release is that that
14 household members element to take advantage of the 14 appointment is set up this week and that you
15 plea bargain agreement?
15 follow through with the domestic violence
16
A. Yes, ma'am.
16 evaluation.
17
Q. You do wish to plead guilty to this
17
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
18 offense?
18
MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, are you going to
19
A. Yes, ma'am. I was preparing to leave
19 be ordering an evaluation?
20 town that morning.
20
THE COURT: I will also order an alcohol
21
TIlE COURT: All right. Well, this is
21 evaluation, and the defense may choose to order
22 properly pled. You say you do want to plead
22 the alcohol evaluation. The defendant needs to
23 guilty to it. There is a factual basis to this
23 provide the order for the domestic violence
24 plea. I do think you understand the nature of the
24 evaluation. The appointment does have to be done
25 offense and the conse uences of leadin ull ,
25 this week.
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MR. MARTENS: As we were sitting here, I was
writing down the information of Tom Wilson for
him.
THE COURT: What I run into is problems with
people not taking care of it quickly enough, and
so I'm just going to make that a condition of your
release. It will cause you to lose your bond
unless you get that appointment set up this week.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: We will have that August 24th at
3 for sentencing. Fill out the questionnaire. I
get the State's side of the case, so you want to
make sure I get your side.
MR. MARTENS: Where he is out of custody,
does he need an order to do that? He can just
make an appointment.
THE COURT: Tom Wilson likes an order. You
can talk to Tom Wilson, but get that appointment
set up.
MR. MARTENS: Okay.
THE COURT: Maybe he has changed his mind.
People do.
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Proceedings concluded.)
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BOISE, IDAHO
Monday, August 24, 2009, 3:00 p.m.

THE COURT: The presentence investigator has
requested a continuance on this, so I will set
this over for September 9th at 4 o'clock.
MR. MARTENS: I've got a conflict that day,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: I could set it for September 8th
at 4 o'clock, or 4:30.
MR. MARTENS: 4:30 would work.
THE COURT: All right, I will set it for
September 8th at 4:30. That's a Tuesday.
MS. MORRISON: And, Your Honor, that's 4:30?
THE COURT: Um-hmm.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MS. MORRISON: No, Your Honor.
MR. MARTENS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I'll see you, then,
on September 8th at 4:30 p.m.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
MR. MARTENS: That will be fine, Your Honor.
I have the evaluation here that she was looking
for, so we should be in good shape.
THE COURT: Well-Well -- oka . Get that ri ht to
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her.
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MR. MARTENS: Okay. Thank you.
(Proceedings concluded.)
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THE COURT: All right, I will take up State
versus Jeffrey Murray. Sorry to make you wait. I
was considerably longer than I anticipated, but
that seems to happen sometimes.
The defendant is here before the court
for sentencing. He had previously been arraigned.
At the time of his arraignment, he was
advised of the nature of the charges against
agains t him,
also of his rights, including his right to plead
not guilty, to have a jury trial, to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, to put on
evidence if he desired to do so, and to exercise
the privilege against self-incrimination.
He was told that he would give up these
rights, along with his defenses, if he pled
guilty.
In this case, he did plead guilty. He
pled guilty to the Second Amended Information, one
count of domestic violence.
The State was going to recommend a
sentence of three plus seven for ten, to be
Jail.
to 120
Ada

Reporter, Ada County, Idaho
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The defendant was required as part of
the plea bargain agreement to get a domestic
violence evaluation, which he did and which I have
reviewed, so we talked about the plea.
It was a valid plea. I did accept it.
I have received presentence materials, which I
have reviewed in detail, and I will take up any
changes or corrections.
Any by the State?
MS. BU1TRAM: Your Honor, I don't know how
this typically works, but in the domestic violence
evaluation, Tom Wilson notes that the victim was
incarcerated, and I believe that should be
"unavailable," not "incarcerated."
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. BUITRAM: She was in a different
situation than that.
THE COURT: All right, the record will
reflect your remarks on that, and I will make a
notation that the State advises me that is
"unavailable," not "incarcerated."
MS. BU1TRAM: Thank you.
THE COURT: And that was on -- okay, and
that was on page 3?
MS. BUTTRAM:
BU1TRAM: Yes, Your Honor.
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THECOURT:
THE
COURT: Okay.
Okay, any by the defense?
MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, we will just bring
it up in argument.
THE COURT: All right. Will there be
testimony today?
MS. BUITRAM: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Will there be testimony by the
defense?
MR. MARTENS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then I will hear the arguments
of counsel.
BUITRAM: Your Honor, this defendant has
MS. BUTTRAM:
very little criminal history and no prior
felonies.
At the time the State entered into this
agreement, the State had no knowledge of these
other women, and so, obviously, that information
that came out in the PSI is very disturbing, but I
believe it further supports the State's
recommendation and belief that jail time is
appropriate in this case, as well as the domestic
violence treatment as recommended by Tom Wilson.
So, Your Honor, the State is asking
this court to impose a three-plus-seven for ten-
ten --

29

I shouldn't say impose it, order that and suspend
1 probably they are disturbing even to me. I find
it with 120 days in the Ada County jail forthwith.
2 it quite disgusting.
But at the same time, the question is,
I'm asking that you order that the
3
4 is whether he's out there breaking the law
defendant obtain the treatment that the evaluator
suggests, as well as any treatment that his
5 habitually, and I think there is some question -
-6 l think it's real questionable that that's the
probation officer orders.
We are asking for a no-contact order
7 case, that he is out breaking the law as a
with the victim and, Your Honor, the victim has
8 habitual offender.
also asked that the no-eontact
Irregardless of that presentence
no-contact cover her two minor
9
children and ex-husband. She said he made treats
10 investigation, the thing -- I just kind of had an
to her before regarding her family.
11 overall problem with the presentence investigation
12 and Tom Wilson's report myself, just simply
She also stays at that residence at
times, and that's the reason for my request on the
13 because that he got a letter from his estranged
no-contact.
14 wife, and they just kind of ran with it and dug
$1,553 restitution. That money would
15 and dug and dug.
be for the paramedics and the 5t. Luke's medical
And a lot of the information in here,
16
bill.
17 I'm not trying to make excuses for my client. I
THE COURT: Counsel for the defense?
18 think a lot of things he does is disgusting. But
MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, we too would ask 19 at the same time, he admits to it -- at the same
that you follow the agreement. I have reviewed
20 time a lot of the stuff in the presentence
the presentence investigation, and like the
21 investigation, there is -- there are no backups or
prosecutor said, there is -- some of the facts are
22 bases.
disturbing.
23
It's just one person says that somebody
Some of the things that may be illegal,
24 committed suicide. It must have been Jeff
my client has engaged in in his personal life or
25 Murray's fault. It's just kind of baseless. I
..
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didn't find the presentence investigation or Tom
Wilson's report to be that helpful in this case.
Quite simply, everything seems to be
based on one letter and then expanded upon from
that one letter. It's a little disturbing to me.
I think that he does need treatment. I
would hope that treatment can maybe straighten him
out. I think, like I say, some of the things he
does is kind of disgusting.
I think a no-contact order is
appropriate, and I think treatment's appropriate
in this case.
We would ask that you follow the
agreement and order that he get the treatment that
he probably needs and leave the no-contact order
in place.
He doesn't have any desire to be around
the victim or her husband at this point. So
that's what we would ask for, Your Honor. Thank
you.
THE COURT: Mr. Murray, your comments?
THE DEFENDANT: I agree with Mr. Martens.
THE COURT: Is there any legal cause why we
should not proceed?
BUTTRAM: No, Your Honor.
MS. BUTIRAM:
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1
MR. MARTENS: No, Your Honor.
2
THE COURT: Well, this case comes before the
3 court after on the defendant's plea to domestic
4 violence.
Violence.
5
The presentence materials received by
6 the court indicated that not only was there an
7 incident -- a troubling incident of domestic
8 violence in and of itself, but that it appeared to
9 be part of a much more extensive and long-lasting
10 pattern of behavior.
11
The particular case -- in this
12 particular case, paramedics were summoned to
13 assist the victim. She had lost consciousness.
14 At several times, she complained of coughing up
15 blood. They observed swelling on her throat.
16
The defendant's initial version was
17 that he was just helping her - later said that
18 there had been, in his expression, rough sex, and
19 that is why she was injured in the fashion that
20 she was.
21
The investigators in this case noted
22 the victim's extreme reluctance to discuss what
23 had occurred. The victim wouldn't talk about it
24 until she was assured that the defendant was not
25 nearb .
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That's clearly verifiable by other
1 difficult to verify.
people. This is observations of the
2
However, in this case the presentence
investigators. Based on her version, there was an
3 investigator went considerably farther than just
argument. She struck the defendant, and then he
4 getting information from the defendant's ex-wife.
ramps it up.
5
The presentence investigator also
When he is confronted with the more
6 discussed this with police authorities in the
7 state in which the defendant was residing at the
significant version, he basically says, "Well, it
happened as a result of rough sex, and that it was
8 time of these prior incidents of domestic
9 violence, and also stalking behavior of other
not of concern."
10 girlfriends or significant others occurred.
The presentence investigator looked
11
into his past background and history with respect
The letter that we received from the
12 prior ex-wife of the defendant, to summarize it,
to domestic violence, and as counsel has pointed
13 was that he had been viciously abusive to her. At
out, his ex-wife did write to the court outlining
14 one point, he cut her breast with a knife. She
a pretty horrific situation of domestic violence
15 cried. He laughed, and he had sex with her.
and abuse.
16
It is sometimes difficult for courts to
This information is verified by a
know how to weigh allegations of domestic violence 17 police officer to whom he shows pornographic
18 pictures of the woman that the police officer is
or abuse from ex-spouses because, unfortunately,
19 later to determine is, in fact, his then wife, who
many times courts do get allegations that are not
substantiated or are difficult to substantiate.
20 was the author of the letter.
Usually those allegations are made in
21
And in those pictures, it is clear that
domestic courts in connection with child custody
22 there is blood around her mouth and nose, she's
issues. That seems to be a situation that can
23 tied up, her hands are purple, her breast has been
sometimes draw out allegations that are sometimes
24 tied in such a way that it's turning purple, and
difficult to consider and are certain! sometimes
25 he told the olice officer who saw these ver
Susan G. Gcmbee,
bee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho
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troubling pictures that it was just rough sex.
He also has admitted to other police
authorities of slashing the tires of his either
girlfriend's car or her boyfriend's car, a car in
the household of a woman who previously had been
involved with him.
Another girlfriend reported him
breaking a porch light. That wasn't able to be
confirmed. That woman later committed suicide,
and I don't think it's fair to say -- who knows
why she was that unhappy, and I don't think that's
fair to attribute anything to anybody in
particular.
Tom Wilson also engaged in a fairly
extensive investigation into a domestic violence
in the defendant's past. Tom Wilson concludes
from the information that he obtains that the
defendant minimizes the extent of his past
violence.
He may have alcohol issues, which he
minimizes, because there are some indications that
some of the violence and abuse occurs in the
context of alcohol abuse.
Tom Wilson concludes he does have poor
impulse control. He does additional checking,
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additional verification. He, of course, brings
all the information to the attention of the
defendant, who says that he last engaged in, or he
terms as rough sex, and Tom Wilson concludes that
the defendant is of medium to high risk to
reoffend.
The presentence investigator who, in my
view, did a thorough job of trying to track down
other sources of information, advises the court
that the defendant shows no remorse over any harm
to past Significant others.
It is clear that he has violated past
protection orders when some of these incidents of
domestic violence occurred, and there is a pattern
of disregarding past protection orders.
There is sadistic sexual behavior with
multiple partners carrying a Significant risk to
their safety.
My review of this entire picture is
that the defendant is a person who's exhibited
some significant danger towards others in his
past.
He will not be manageable on probation
because of his past disregard to protection orders
by his own admission, and some of this misconduct

37

is coming straight from his own admissions. It is
1 incident.
quite -- it is without question that he has
It's not one time with a person who
2
violated past protection orders.
3 maybe drank too much and was kind of blowing up
And there is also independent evidence
4 and doing something stupid that that person has
by police officers of sadistic violent behavior
5 never done before, but it's part of a pattern of
towards his sexual partners which has carried a
6 extreme sadistic behavior towards partners.
risk of serious bodily injury or possible even
7
And I think there's a very high risk
death to these sexual partners.
8 for reoffense. I think, for the deterrence of the
I don't think the defendant is
9 defendant, for the imposition of a penalty, and
manageable on probation. I also think there is a
10 for wrongful conduct, and to encourage the
high risk of reoffense.
11 defendant to re-think how he characterizes his
I think the defendant clearly shows
12 behavior, I think a penalty is appropriate.
that he minimizes his risk to others, that he
13
I don't think this is a case where the
14 defendant is amenable to probation because of the
thinks it's no big deal, and I think it is not
inconceivable that someone could die during these
15 number of violations of protective orders, and the
so-called consensual events or very likely suffer
16 violence in his past relationships is of such a
severe bodily injury.
17 magnitude that I am concerned that there could be
I cannot follow this plea bargain
18 death or severe bodily injury.
agreement. I don't think it is sufficiently
19
Therefore, I'm imposing a sentence of
20 three years fixed, followed by seven years
protective of the public. I think the defendant
needs a penalty for what he has done to this
21 indeterminate, for a ten-year sentence.
22
particular victim in this case.
You do have 42 days in which to appeal.
23 It is not the court's intention to either retain
She lost consciousness multiple times.
24 jurisdiction or to suspend the sentence and place
She was coughing up blood. She showed visible
external injuries, and it is not an isolated
25 the defendant on probation.
external'
bation.
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7

1I think a penalty's appropriate, and I
think a penalty may be all that can happen to
convince the defendant to change his ways before
somebody dies. Court will recess.
(Proceedings concluded.)
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I, Susan G. Gambee, Official Court
Reporter, County of Ada, State of Idaho, hereby
certify:
That 1I am the reporter who took the
proceedings had in the above-entitled action in
machine shorthand and thereafter the same was
reduced into typewriting under my direct
supervision; and
That to the extent the audio was audible
and intelligible, the foregoing transcript
contains a full, true, and accurate record of the
proceedings had in the above and foregoing cause,
which was heard at Boise, Idaho.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
my hand March 16, 2010.
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_Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _Minimum
/
_Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ _ _ __
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STATEMENT OF RlGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA
OF GUILTY

(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE)

J

1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything
s) you are accused of committing. I f you elected to have a r:;:r:~
about the crime(
crime(s)
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions.
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.

r;t

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial.
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights unde
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s)
to which you are pleading guilty.

,';14

I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still haveifl
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respe
.
to answering questions or providing infonnation that may increase my
sentence.

'fJ1.

)IJ

3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who
will be paid by the county.

/J-4
/J-d

,//(
'1/(
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4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1)
I) you
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial.

~ understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed

Innocent.
innocent.

i
J
;n
(;71
tTl
/,/""L
//"1

s. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court/, /VI
S.
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s)
/' (
brought against you. In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in
your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must convince
each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

~

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and /
public jury trial.
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs
during a jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to
testify under oath in front of you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney
could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could also call your
own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or
innocence. If you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the
state will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to court.

; / /JA

p. ('(
p'('(

;I,/,J1
;j
#

v{

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront the
witnesses against me, an present witnesses and evidence in my defense.

~

QllESTIONS REGARDING PLEA
(Please answer every question. If
you do not understand a question
Uyou
consult your attorney before answering.>
answering.)
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE
1.
I. Do you read and write the English language?@NO
I f not, have you been provided with an interpreter to
If
help you till out this torm? YES NO
2. \Vhat is your age? !iJ.....
!1.J.....
M lA tlelfY
t!elfY
/n
3. \Vhat is your true legal name? :S(.r::-r~£V
Cr::"r ~£V '))l\t1J£
ylltv£' /
' ciA
oU".c~£ c-~I'i $"5"£5
4. How far did you go in school? i2 of- SO~C C oU".£~£
If you did not complete high school, have you received
either a general education diploma or high school

:s

,M
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equivalency diploma?@NO
5. Are you currently under the care of a mental
health professional? YES@
6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental
health disorder? YES@
I f i C t was the diagnosis and when was it made?
"€
fe) ~~ ,q~~ fF

~

/2//

~ :r~t ?:21;~fF#.1:
~ ./JIH..

e

Co

-

-/ '

,

D

,,'I

c ,S"'i

7. Are you c rrently prescribed any edication? YE NO ~
If so, have you taken your pr~ecrition medicatIOn
during the past 24 hours? YE N
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken y medications
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages
which you believe affect your ability to make a reasoned
and informed decision in this case? YES(NO')
9. Is there any other reason that you wou~ unable
to make a reasoned and informed decision in this
case?YES@
10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement?@NO
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? (If
available, a written plea agreement should be attached
hereto as "Addendum 'Am)

W'/frJ.

II. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement.
This means that the court is not bound by the agreement or any
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized
by law, up to the maximum sentence for any offense. Because the court
is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow
the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.
/1. As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading
11.

000032
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guilty to more than one crime? YES@
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each
If
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after
the other)? YES NO
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which YOu~
a
_ (' -(}-;;;;'~~
-(}-;;;;;'~~
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues YE N~ _('
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appea ? J /;'tL ~ f1 ~
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment
~
of conviction and~ence as part of your plea
agreement? YES~
15. Have any other promises been made to you which
have influenced your decision to plead guilty? YES@
If so, what are those promises?

16.Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss
your case with your attorney?@NO
17. Have you told your attorney everything you know
about the crime?@§)NO
18. Is there anything you have requested your attorney
to do that has not been done? YES @
If
yes, please
rfyes,
explain. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

19. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor
relating to your case. This may include police
reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs,
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called
discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence provided to
your attorney during discovery?@§)NO
20.Have you told your attorney about any witnesses
who would show your innocence? ~NO
2 I. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you
21.
will waive any defenses, both factual and legal, that
you bel ieve you may have in this case:@:NO
case?@:NO

000033
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22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief CI
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YES ~
If so, what motions or
requests?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea
I) any searches or seizures that occurred in
including: 1)
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any ~
statements you may have made to law enforcement? ~ NO
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty,
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation
contained in the charge(s) to which you plead
guilty?@NO
25. Are you currently on probation or parole? YES@)
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this
case could be the basis of a violation of that probation
or parole? YES NO
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual
admissions could have consequences of deportation
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the
United States, or denial of an application for United
States citizenship?@NO
27.00 you know whether the crime to which you will
you_~ister as a sex
plead guilty would require you_~ister
offender? (I.C. § 18-8304) YE~
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case?
(I.C. § 19-5304)(YES)NO
29.Have you ag;eeato pay restitution to any other
party as a condition of your plea agreement? YEs@>
If so, to whom?
30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension
as a result of a guilty plea in this case? YES®
If so, for how long must your license
be suspended?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
31. Are you pleading guilty to a crime tor which a

-------------------------------
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mandatory domestic violence, substance abuse, or
ISpsychosexual evaluation is~euired? (I.C. §§ 18
91S(7)(a),-8005(9),-S317)
918(7)(a),-8005(9),-83
17) ES NO
32. Are you pleading guilty a crime for which you
prose~' nand
may be required to pay the costs of prose~'
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K)) YE N
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for w ich you
will be required to submit a DNA sample to the state?
(I.C. § 19-5506) YES@
gUilty to a crime for which the
34. Are you pleading guilty
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up
$5,000~,\b_Ie to the victim of the crime? (I.C. §
to $5,000~,\b_Ie
19-5307)~O

35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
lo@r right to vote in Idaho? (10. CONST. art. 6, §
3) ES NO
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will
hO~bliC office in Idaho? (IO.
lose your right to hO~bliC
NO
CONST. art. 6, § 3)
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a
felony, during the period of your. sentence, you will
lose your right to perform jury service in Idaho? (10.
CONST. art. 6, § 3)@NO
gUilty to a
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty
righ~tchase, possess, or
felony you will lose your righ~tchase,
carry firearms? (I.C. § 18-310 YES 0
, ncluding your
39. Do you understand that no 0 ,ncluding
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case?~ NO
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarilf@§JNO
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did commit
the acts alleged in the information or indictment? @NO
42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help
you fill out this form, have you had any trouble understanding
your interpreter? YES@
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the
questions in this form which you could not resolve by
discussing the issue with your attorney? YES

@
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I have answered the questions on each page of this Guilty Plea Advisory
form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and answers in this fonn,
and I have discussed each question and answer with my attorney, and have
completed this fonn freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one
has threatened me to do so.
Dated this day of~,
~, 20/,)
20/) q .

f1~'t
f1
~'f

rJ ~.

~
J.L+

DEFENDAN
I hereby acknowledge that I have Iscussed, in detail, the foregoing
questions and answers
with my client.
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jacksonsLln.com
jacksonsun.com
First in News.
No indictment in stabbing
death: Bells woman remains
in jail on assault charge

Evans dragged Murray Qut
out of the house, leaving her
with knots on her head and abrasions. According to
the affidavit charging Murray, Evans said she had
become irate and was throwing things. He then
grabbed her by the arm and pushed her away, but
she followed him to a nearby shop and threatened
him with a tire iron.
Evans also was charged in an incident in which he
threatened to kill his mother, according to court
records.

BY STANLEY DUNLAP
SDUNLAP@JACKSONSUN.COM
- Stanley Dunlap, 425-9668
• October 6, 2010

jury declined this week to indict a
A Crockett County jUry
woman on a charge of second-degree murder after
her boyfriend was killed following a fight in July.
The grand jury returned the no true bill on Monday
for Regina Murray, who had been charged by
authorities in the death of Greg Evans, according to
the Crockett County Circuit Court Clerk's Office.
Murray was accused of stabbing Evans, 47, in the
leg with a kitchen knife after the two got into a
physical fight in their home on Tenn. 88 in Bells on
July 13. According to the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation, a medical examiner ruled Evans bled
to death from the wound on his leg.
Murray remains in jail on charges stemming from a
separate incident in which police
pOlice say she threatened
knife. Murray will
Evans' mother with a kitchen knife,
appear in court Monday on the charges of
aggravated assault and assault in the August 2009
incident.

(Murray)

District Attorney General Garry Brown said
prosecutors are still
stili deciding whether to bring the
second-degree murder charge before a second
jury.
grand jury,

Vir::
VIr:: focus on
Murray's Public Defender Jamie Berkley said,
"Obviously what happened was tragic, but in our
investigation of the case, we think the grand jury
stands."
made the right decision and hope it stands,"
The couple had a history of domestic disputes,
according to court records.
Evans was found guilty of misdemeanor domestic
assault April 15 after he hit Murray, according to
court records.
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Evans and Murray both were charged with domestic
assault after a September 2009 incident, but the
char es later were dismissed. That affidavit states

EXHIBIT ~
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YARRO, CLERK

THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310

JEFFREY MURRAY, PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff( 5)
vs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT

Defendant(s)

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed,
by United States Mail, one copy of the: VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST
LR.C.P. to each of the parties
CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P.
or attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
INTEROFFICE MAIL
DENNIS BENJAMIN
ATTORNY AT LAW
HAND DELIVERED
Dated:Wednesday, October 27, 2010

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CVPClO-2131O
CRFE09006102
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPTS

-------------)
---------------------------)

A Petition for Post Conviction Relief having been filed herein and it appearing therefrom
that a transcript of the Sentencing before the District Court is required to resolve the issues
raised;
LC.R. 54 that a transcript be prepared of the Entry of
IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to I.C.R.
Plea hearing dated July 13, 2009, and the Sentencing hearing dated September 8, 2009, on case
CRFE09006102, at the expense of Ada County.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk of the District Court shall immediately
serve copies of this order on all parties or their attorneys, and the trial court transcriber.
Dated this 29 th day of October, 2010.

DEBORAH A. BAIL
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAn..ING
I hereby certify that on this 29 th day of October, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPT MAn..
DENNIS BENJAMIN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701
COURT REPORTER-SUSAN GAMBEE
INTERDEPT MAn..

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Court Clerk
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

8 2010
NOV U82010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT FOR THE FOURTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STA
TE OF IDAHO,
STATE

CV-PC-1021310
CASE NO. CV-PC-l021310
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

)

)
)
)

Respondent.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, asks this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 20l(d),
201(d), to take judicial
notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, Presentence Investigation Report,
Jv!urray, Ada County CR-FE-2009-6l02,
CR-FE-2009-61 02,
exhibits and record in the case of State v. Jeffrey JII!urray,

including the guilty plea questionnaire and the transcripts of the change of plea hearing and
sentencing hearing. (Copies of which are attached to the petition for post-conviction relief.)
Respectfully submitted

thi~~ay
thi~'""'fI)ay of November, 2010.

U.lAA,,-ts.:e ~~--U.lAA"-ts.:e
Dennis Benj amin
•
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~y of November, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be

Xmailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., #3191
Boise, ID 83702

~~ e
Dennis Benjamin
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NOV l 2 2010

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

J. DAVID NAVARRO, C;er~
RA~JDALL
By J. RA~JDALL
DEPUiV

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-2010-21310
Case No. CV-PC-2010-21310
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
POST-CONVICTION

------------)
---------------------------)

COMES NOW, Respondent, the State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of
record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and in ANSWER to Petitioner's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, admits, denies, alleges and moves to dismiss the
Petition as follows:
I. DEFENSES

FIRST DEFENSE
Petitioner's Verified Petition raises no genume Issue of material fact.
Therefore, the Petition should be summarily dismissed pursuant to I. C. § 19-4906(b), (c).
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY
ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
CVPC2010-21310), Page1 " ,
000043

•
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Petitioner failed to raise the issues contained in his Verified Petition on
appeal.

Therefore, these issues are barred, and the Petition should be summarily

19-490 1(b).
dismissed pursuant to I. C. § 19-4901(b).
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Verified Petition fails to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel; further Petitioner has failed
to establish that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and the conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the conviction and sentence relied upon has produced an unjust result.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); State v. Ivey, 123 Idaho 77,844 P.2d
706 (1992). Therefore, said allegations should be dismissed.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Respondent denies each and every allegation of Petitioner's Verified Petition not
herein specifically and expressly admitted.
1. Answering Paragraphs 1-7 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

admits the allegations contained therein.
2. Answering Paragraph 8 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has
insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation;
3. Answering Paragraphs 9-19 of the Petitioner's Verified Petition,

said

Respondent admits the allegation contained therein.
4. Answering Paragraph 20 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

denies the allegation contained therein. Paragraph 11 of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form
specifically notified the Petitioner that the Court was not bound by the agreement and in
fact could impose a sentence up to the maximum prescribed by law.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY
ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
CVPC2010-21310), Page 2
000044

5. Answering Paragraphs 21-22 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
has insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the
allegation.
6. Answering Paragraph 23 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

denies the allegation contained therein and refers the Court back to Paragraph 4 of this
Answer.
7. Answering Paragraph 24 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

admits the allegation contained therein.
8. Answering Paragraph 25 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
denies the allegation contained therein and refers the Court back to Paragraph 4 of this
Answer.
9. Answering Paragraphs 26-27 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
admits the allegations contained therein.
10. Answering Paragraph 28 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
denies the allegation contained therein.
11. Answering Paragraph 29 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has

insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation.
12. Answering Paragraph 30 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent rere
alleges the same answers provided above.
13. Answering Paragraph 31 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
denies the allegation contained therein.
14. Answering Paragraph 32 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has
insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation.
15. Answering Paragraph 33 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

admits the allegation contained therein.
16. Answering Paragraphs 34-37 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
has insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the
allegation.

ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY
CVPC2010-21310), Page 3
000045

17. Answering Paragraph 38 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
admits the allegation contained therein.

Per the plea agreement the Petitioner was

required to obtain a domestic violence evaluation.
18. Answering Paragraphs 39-55 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
has insufficient infonnation about said allegations contained therein and denies the
allegations.
19. Answering Paragraph 56 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

denies the allegation contained therein. Per Exhibit C attached to Petitioner's Verified
Petition the incident alleged here did not occur until September 26, 2009; Petitioner's
sentencing hearing took place on September 8, 2009.
20. Answering Paragraph 57-58 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
admits the allegations contained therein.
21. Answering Paragraph 59 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has

insufficient infonnation about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation.
22. Answering Paragraph 38 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
admits the portion of the allegation in sentence 1; said Respondent denies the remainder,
in that the article states that Petitioner's wife "was accused of stabbing Evans," not that
she "killed her boyfriend, and that "prosecutors are still deciding whether to bring the
second-degree murder charge before a second grand jury. "
23. Answering Paragraphs 61-68 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

has insufficient infonnation about said allegations contained therein and denies the
allegations.
24. Answering Paragraph 69 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent rere

alleges the same answers provided above.
25. Answering Paragraphs 70-73 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent

has insufficient infonnation about said allegations contained therein and denies the
allegations.

ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY
CVPC2010-21310), Page 4
000046

•
26. Answering Paragraph 74 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
denies the allegation contained therein.
27. Answering Paragraph 75 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
admits the allegation contained therein.
28. Answering Paragraphs 76-83 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent
has insufficient information about said allegations contained therein and/or denies the
allegations.

ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY
CVPC2010-21310), Page 5
000047

•
WHEREFORE, the Respondent prays this Court to consider the Petitioner's
Petition, the Respondent's Answer, the pleadings and record in the above-entitled case
and in criminal case CR-FE-2009-0006102, and the pleadings and record before the
Idaho Court of Appeals and prays for relief as follows:
A.

That Petitioner's Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be

B.

That Petitioner's Verified Petition be dismissed;

C.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary in the

denied;

premIses.

.1JL day of November 2010.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This .iJL
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Ij
VL,art4~~
VL,art4~~

r

By:""' Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this d.~ day of November 2010, I served a true
POSTand correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF to: Dennis Benjamin, Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP,
303 W. Bannock, PO Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83701, by depositing in the U.S. mail,
postage prepaid.

Laurel Thomas, Legal Assistant
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY
ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
CVPC2010-213 10), Page 6
000048
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
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J. DAVID NAVARAO, Clerf<
0Ierf<
By KATHY BIEHL
DBPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
Ys.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-102131O

OBJECTION TO STATE'S
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

--------------)
-----------------------------)

Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, objects to the State's "motion" for dismissal found within its
Answer for the following reasons.
To begin, a request for dismissal made within an Answer is not a proper motion for
summary dismissal. Saykharnchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). All
the State requests in its introductory paragraph and in its prayer for relief is for the petition to be
dismissed or denied. Therefore, the State has failed to make a proper motion for summary
disposition under I.e. § 19-4906(c).
In Saykharnchone, the petitioner argued that the district court erred in dismissing his
application because he did not get the twenty-day notice required under I.e. § 19-4906(b). The

1·
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State responded that the twenty-day notice was not required because it had made a motion to
dismiss under I.e. § 19-4906(c). The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the State
never filed a motion to dismiss. It only requested that the Court dismiss the petition in the
Answer. "Under the circumstances," the Court wrote, "we do not believe the state's general
request in the Answer's prayer for relief can fairly constitute a 'motion.'"
'motion. '" 127 Idaho at 322, 900
P.2d at 798. "Here, the better practice would have been for the state to file a separate motion
under subsection (c). But at a minimum, the state's prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient
for not stating its grounds with particularity, and for not stating that it was the state's motion for
summary disposition under I.e. § 19-4906(c)." [d. "Furthermore, when the state files an answer,
as it did here, the petitioner can rightly expect the matter will go to an evidentiary hearing on the
issues framed by the pleadings, unless the district court provides a twenty-day notice of intent to
dismiss, or the state files a motion for summary disposition." [d. Accordingly, the Court vacated
the order of dismissal.
Saykhamchone was distinguished in Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798

(2007). "Unlike the State's answer in Saykhamchone, the State in this case submitted not just an
answer but a motion to dismiss. This document contained twenty-two pages of argument
categorically addressing Workman's allegations, identified by number." The Court found this
document was adequate to put "Workman on notice of the basis for the State's request that the
petition be summarily dismissed." 144 Idaho at 524, 164 P.3d at 804. The Court went on to
express its disapproval of the combination Answer/Motion. It wrote:
While we conclude the State's answer and motion to dismiss in this case were
technically sufficient under I.C. § 19-4906(c) and Saykhamchone, we reiterate our
direction in Saykhamchone that the preferable practice is: (1) to file a motion
2·
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separate from the answer, (2) to identify that motion as a motion for summary
disposition, not a motion to dismiss, and (3) to use the language of I.C.
19-4906(c) and cite that specific statutory provision in support of the motion for
summary disposition. It should be absolutely clear to a defendant that the State is
not just responding to a petition but is seeking summary disposition without an
evidentiary hearing and without further notice to the defendant.
Id.

The pleading in this case is different than the combination AnswerIMotion for Summary
Disposition filed in Workman and is more like the Answer filed in Saykhamchone. The State's
pleading here is styled an Answer, it never identifies itself as a motion for summary dismissal
and it fails to ask for summary dismissal in either the introductory paragraph or in the prayer for
relief. And, as will be discussed in detail below, each of the State's four purported defenses are
inadequately pleaded. The State's "First Affirmative Defense" fails to provide adequate notice
for the basis of its motion. The State's "Second Affirmative Defense" fails "to use the language
of I.C. 19-4906(c) and cite that specific statutory provision in support of the motion for summary
disposition." The State's "Third Affirmative Defense" and "Fourth Defense" suffer from the
same deficiency. In all of them, unlike Workman, the State fails to make any convincing
argument in support of its request. Thus, it would be error under Saykhamchone
Saykhamchol1e to summarily
dismiss under I.C. § 19-4906(c) without an adequate motion from the State.
1. The State's First Affirmative Defense Is Not Stated with Sufficient Particularity.

As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: "Because a post-conviction relief
proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806,
813,907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); I.C. § 19-4907(a), a motion for summary disposition must 'state
with particularity the grounds therefor.'" DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601,200 P.3d 1148,

3·
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1150 (2009), quoting Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995);
LR.C.P. 7(b
)(1). The State must state the basis for its motion to dismiss with reasonable
7(b)(1).
particularity. Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288,292, 399 P.2d 262,264-65 (1965). Notice is only
sufficient if the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice. [d. at 292,399 P.2d at 265;

DeRushe, supra.
Here, the State's "First Affirmative Defense" is a mere boilerplate allegation that
"Petitioner's Verified Petition raises no genuine issue of material fact." This is plainly
inadequate under DeRushe and does not set forth a reason for summary dismissal. (Furthermore,
as will be discussed in Section 3 below, the petition does raise genuine issues of material fact.)

2. The State's Second Affirmative Defense Is Without Merit.
The State next argues the issues raised in the petition are barred because they were not
raised on appeal. However, such a fai lure acts as a bar only if the issue could have been raised
on appeal. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) states, in relevant part, that "[a]ny issue which could have

been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post
postconviction proceedings[.]" (Emphasis added.) In this case, none of the issues raised in the
petition could have been raised on appeal. Therefore, the 19-4901(b) defense is not applicable
here.
The first cause of action is that the plea of guilty was invalid because it was not knowing,
intelligent and voluntary. Mr. Murray could not raise that claim on appeal because it requires
that evidence outside the appellate record be presented to the Court. Further, as alleged in the
petition, neither of Mr. Murray's counsel advised him that he could file a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea under LC.R. 33 and no such motion was ever filed. Thus, Mr. Murray could not have
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raised this claim because general issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Under
State v. Perry, - Idaho -. -

P.3d -,2010 WL 2880156 (2010), if an error is not objected to, it

will only be reviewed by an appellate court if the defendant persuades "the appellate court that
the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2)
plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless." Id, at 17. See also, State v. Green, 130 Idaho 503,
506,943 P.2d 929, 931 (1997) ("If a defendant disputes that his guilty plea was voluntarily or
knowingly made, or disputes any of the other factors listed above, he may move to have the
guilty plea withdrawn pursuant to LC.R. 33(c) .... Thus, before this Court can decide whether a
guilty plea was appropriately accepted, the issue must be preserved by the defendant by first
moving to have the plea withdrawn.").
Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument in Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho
894,865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App.1993). In Ricca, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant may
challenge the validity of a guilty plea during post-conviction proceedings, so long as the
defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea below. Id. at 896-97, 865 P.2d at
987-88; see also, Mendiola v. State, -

Idaho - , -

P.3d -,2010 WL 4483675 *3 (Ct. App.

November 10, 2010) ("Mendiola was not barred from raising claims challenging the validity of
his guilty plea in his application for post-conviction relief. Therefore, the district court did not
err in determining that Mendiola's claims regarding his guilty plea were properly before the
district court.").
Thus, the State's argument in this regard is not well-taken.
The second cause of action is that counsel at the plea and sentencing hearings was
constitutionally ineffective and the third cause of action is that counsel at post-trial proceedings
5·
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was constitutionally ineffective. It is well established that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel should not be raised on direct appeal. As explained in State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427,
App.2001):
434-35,34 P.3d 1110, 1117-18 (Ct. App.200l):
Factual questions relating to the competency of counsel generally pose a dilemma
for an appellate court attempting to review the record; in such circumstances a
separate hearing usually is required. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is an issue rarely appropriate on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction;
rather it is usually reserved for post-conviction relief proceedings, where a more
complete evidentiary record can be developed. The resolution of such factual
issues for the first time on appeal, based upon a trial record in which competence
of counsel was not at issue, is at best conjectural. Post-conviction counsel must
have the ability to develop a separate evidentiary record on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, including the ability to call witnesses and present
evidence in a separate civil proceeding. This Court has consistently held that the
appropriate procedure for adult criminal defendants to bring an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is through an application for post-conviction relief
In this case, the record on appeal does not provide sufficient evidence to evaluate
Doe's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, we conclude that any
attempt to decide Doe's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal
would be, at best, conjectural.
State v. Doe, 136 Idaho at 43334 P.3d at 1116 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted); see
also State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 197,923 P.2d 439, 442 (1996) ("Roberts' ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is more appropriately considered through an application for
post-conviction relief.").
In short, the State's claim that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims should have
been raised in direct appeal is frivolous and must be rejected.

3. The State's Third Affirmative Defense Is Not Stated with Sufficient Particularity
and is Otherwise Without Merit.
The State's pleading is insufficient.
The State's Third Affirmative Defense does not comply with the practice recommended
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in Saykhamchone and Workman because: (1) it is not a motion separate from the Answer, (2) it
does not identify itself as a motion for summary disposition, and (3) it does not use the language
of I.e. 19-4906(c) or cite that specific statutory provision. In fact, it does not cite to or quote any
statutory provision, nor does it ask that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims be summarily
dismissed. Thus, no proper motion for summary disposition is before this Court.
Moreover, it is wrong when it claims that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, a
court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, and
determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. A
court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need
not accept the petitioner[']s conclusions.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004), quoting
qlloting Saykhamchone,

127 Idaho at 321,900 P.2d at 797 (internal citations omitted). Accord Pizzllto v. State, 149 Idaho
155,160,233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010).
The guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
First, Mr. Murray alleges that he was not aware at the time he entered the guilty plea that
the Coul1 was not required to follow the terms of the plea agreement. Petition, <j[<J[ 20. If true, the
guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because it was not made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). "Whether a plea is voluntary and
understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the
sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers,
and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the
consequences of pleading guilty." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32,34,557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976).
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The plea here was not voluntary and understood because Mr. Murray did not know that the Court
could reject the plea offer.
The State in its Answer denies that allegation because "paragraph 11 of the Guilty Plea
Advisory specifically notified the Petitioner that the Court was not bound by the agreement[.]"
Answer, l)[
<)[ 4. However, the State ignores the allegation in l)[
<)[ 29 of the Petition: "Mr. Martens
specifically told me that paragraph 11 did not apply to me because I was only to be sentenced to
120 days." Moreover, the State ignores the fact that while every other paragraph in the guilty
plea questionnaire required a response from the defendant, Mr. Murray did not answer that he
understood the information contained in paragraph 11. See Exhibit B to Petition. In fact, Mr.
Murray answered every applicable question and acknowledged every "Statement of Rights &
Explanation of Waivers by Plea of Guilty" except paragraph 11. Taking all of Mr. Murray's
factual allegations as true and all reasonable inference in his favor, the Petition raises a genuine
question of material fact in this regard.
Counsel was ineffective under State v. Woods.
Next, the petition alleges that attorney Martens was ineffective for failing to advise Mr.
Murray that he could have obtained a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to
sentencing and that Mr. Martens did not explain to him what rights he was waiving when he
agreed to waive his rights under "State v. Estrada." Mr. Murray then alleges that: "Had I been so
informed, I would have obtained my own confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to
entering a plea of guilty." He also alleges that he only agreed to waive his rights under "State v.
Estrada" because he thought that the Court was required to follow the plea agreement. In the

Answer, the State admits that "[a]t the guilty plea hearing, the Court ordered that a domestic
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violence evaluation be done and submitted to the Court." Petition l)[ 33; Answer l)[ 15. Further,
the State admits that Mr. Murray was required to obtain a domestic violence evaluation as part of
the plea agreement. Petition l)[ 38; Answer l)[ 17.
Further, Mr. Martens did not take any steps to militate the effect of the very unfavorable
evaluation. Mr. Murray alleges that the court-ordered evaluation reached its conclusions based
upon misunderstandings of the facts and that Mr. Martens was in possession of the court-ordered
evaluation prior to sentencing, but that Mr. Martens did not go over the court-ordered evaluation
with Mr. Murray prior to sentencing. The Petition also alleges that Mr. Martens did not contact
Mr. Wilson or take any actions to try to correct those factual misunderstandings in the court
courtordered evaluations. Nor did Mr. Martens inform Mr. Murray that he could get his own
evaluation to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation. Mr. Murray did not believe an
additional evaluation was needed because he believed that the Court was bound to follow the
plea agreement but he would have obtained another evaluation had he known the Court was not
bound by the plea agreement.
These facts set forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because reasonable
professional performance required defense counsel in this case to seek and obtain a confidential
and privileged domestic violence evaluation. This self-evident proposition was made explicit by
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998). In Wood, the defendant was charged with

first-degree murder. Defense counsel arranged for the defendant to be evaluated by a
psychiatrist. Prior to obtaining the psychiatrist's report, the defendant changed his plea to guilty.
The Court then "ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and ordered that the report of defense
psychiatric witness Dr. Vicky Gregory, be included in the PSI." Wood, 132 Idaho at 93, 967 P.2d
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at 707. Defense counsel did not object to the inclusion of the report. When the report turned out
to be unfavorable, defense counsel did not object to its inclusion in the PSI. At the sentencing
hearing, the psychiatrist testified on behalf of the prosecution. Again, defense counsel did not
object to the testimony.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the failure to object to the consideration of the report
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" because: 1) defense counsel did not know
whether the report would be favorable when he failed to object to the Court's order that it be
included in the PSI; and 2) because defense counsel failed to object to the inclusion of the
unfavorable report. Wood, 132 Idaho at 102, 967 P.2d at 715.
The Supreme Court noted that the defense was not obligated to tum over the psychiatric
report under IRE 503(b)(2), which creates a psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal actions,
and that the decision to tum over the report could not have been strategic because defense
counsel did not know what the psychiatrist's conclusions would be at the time the plea was
entered.
The same is true here. Mr. Martens should have had Mr. Murray submit to a confidential
domestic violence evaluation and review it before advising his client to enter into the plea
agreement with the State, especially knowing that the Court would order a domestic violence
evaluation. Under State v. Wood, he should not have agreed to tum over the results of the
domestic violence evaluation prior to its completion and his review thereof. Moreover, defense
counsel should have been aware of the Wood decision as it was issued prior to Mr. Murray's
case. Further, once the report was completed, Mr. Martens should have taken steps to militate
the damage to his client. But, he failed to do anything to challenge the reliability of Mr.
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Wilson's opinions and conclusions. As a result, Mr. Murray has stated a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise Court of mitigating evidence at
sentencing
Mr. Martens' performance at sentencing was also deficient under Strickland. First, he did
not go over the PSI with Mr. Murray until the morning of sentencing and Mr. Murray did not
have enough time to review it prior to sentencing. At the same time, Mr. Martens did not inform
Mr. Murray that he could seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing so they could go over the
PSI. This prejudiced Mr. Murray because the PSI contained damaging statements made by his
wife which were untrue. Mr. Martens, however, did not attempt to disprove these false
statements; nor did he attempt to question the credibility of these statements.
If Mr. Martens had been more fully prepared he could have informed the Court that Mr.
Murray's my wife had been charged with domestic assault against her boyfriend Greg Evans for
throwing things at him and threatening him with a tire iron. In addition, Mr. Murray's wife, at
the time of the sentencing hearing, had been charged with aggravated assault for threatening her
boyfriend's mother with a kitchen knife. Finally, Mr. Martens did not inform the Court at
sentencing that it was mistaken about important facts during sentencing. These are set out at ~[
61 of the Petition. Had Mr. Martens done all the above, there is a reasonable probability that the
Court would have followed the plea agreement. Thus, Mr. Murray has stated a prima facie case
of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington. In
addition, Mr. Martens failed to inform Mr. Murray that he had the right to file a notice of appeal
from the sentencing. He also failed to file such a notice causing Mr. Murray to lose the right to
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appeal the sentence. Had counsel advised Mr. Murray about his right to appeal, Mr. Murray
would have directed Mr. Martens to file an appeal. These facts also establish a prima facie case
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). See e.g.,
Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d 1,4 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Judd's additional allegations

that his counsel failed to file an appeal from the judgment of conviction as requested and failed
to file a motion to reduce the sentence as requested also state cognizable claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.").
Ineffective assistance of counsel at post-sentencing proceedings.

In addition, the Petition sets forth a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel
at post-sentencing proceedings. "A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages
of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion." State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522,
523,873 P.2d '167,168 (Ct. App. 1994) citing Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923 n. 3, 828
P.2d 1323, 1328 n. 3 (Ct. App.1992). The right to counsel necessarily requires the effective
assistance of counsel. Strickland, supra. Here, post-sentencing counsel's performance was
deficient in several respects. First, he did not inform Mr. Murray that he could obtain another
domestic violence evaluation in order to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation and
support his Rule 35 motion. Had Mr. Murray known he could obtain another evaluation, he
would have obtained one. Further, Mr. Ellsworth did not attempt to disprove the false statements
made against Mr. Murray in the Rule 35 Motion. Had he done so, he would have found evidence
which would have demonstrated the unreliability of Mr. Murray's wife's allegations as set forth
in <j[91 56-60 of the Petition. Mr. Ellsworth also did not inform the Court that it was mistaken
about important facts during sentencing as set forth in <j[ 61 of the Petition. However, had Mr.
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Ellsworth adequately prepared the Rule 35 motion and supported it with reasonable available
information, the Court would have granted the Rule 35 and followed the plea agreement. Again,
aaprimajacie
prima Jacie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland has been pleaded and
summary disposition would not be appropriate.

4. The State's "Fourth Defense" Is a Misnomer as it is Actually its Answer to the
Petition.
What the State styles as a "Fourth Defense" is actually its Answer to the allegations in
the Petition. It does not seek summary disposition. As described above, the Petition and its
supporting documents and the State's Answer establishes that there are genuine questions of
material fact in this case and an evidentiary hearing should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted

thiS~y of November, 2010.

~f.~SS ~r ~_
9

\
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

JAN 24
24 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By eARLY LATIMORE
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310

)
)
)
)
)
)

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE
§19-4906(c)

--------------~)
----------------------------~)
Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, moves this Court for its order granting summary disposition in
his favor. This motion is brought pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(
c). It is based on the files and
19-4906(c).
records in this case and the files and record in the case of State v. Jeffrey Murray, Ada County
CR-FE-2009-61 02. It is supported by a memorandum of law filed contemporaneously herewith.
Respectfully submitted

thi~y of January 2011.

DU1JA~~~
Dennis Benjamin
t
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
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Dennis Benjamin
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEIT LLP
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P.O. Box 2772
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(208) 343-1000
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JAN 2 ~ 2011
o. RICH, Clerk
CHRISTOPHER D.
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE
§19-4906(c)

)

Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, submits the following in support of his motion for summary
disposition pursuant to I. C. § 19-4906(c).
19-4906(c).
A. The Plea of Guilty Should Be Vacated Because it Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently

and Voluntarily Made.
Mr. Murray has alleged that he was not aware at the time he entered the guilty plea that
the Court did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement. He has also alleged that he
would not have pleaded guilty had he known. In particular, Mr. Murray states under oath that
Mr. Martens did not tell him that the Court did not have to follow the terms of the plea
agreement. And, the transcript of the change of plea hearing establishes that the Court did not
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tell him that it did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement. See Change of Plea
Hearing Transcript (Exhibit A to petition). Further the Court's guilty plea questionnaire did not
inform Mr. Murray that the Court was not required to follow the terms ofthe plea agreement.
Paragraph 11 of the guilty plea questionnaire only asked if Mr. Murray understood that the Court
was not required to follow the terms of the plea agreement. Guilty Plea Advisory Form, ~ 11
(Exhibit B to petition). Mr. Murray did not respond to Paragraph 11 because he believed that the
Court was required to follow the terms of the plea agreement. Further, Mr. Martens specifically
told Mr. Murray that paragraph 11 did not apply to him because he was only to be sentenced to
120 days.
If the above is true, the guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because it was not made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
"Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the
defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was
not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury
trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the
defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34,
557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). Mr. Murray is entitled to summary disposition because the State has
failed to raise a genuine question as to the truth ofMr. Murray's verified allegations.
The State's response to the above is simply that "paragraph 11 of the Guilty Plea
Advisory specifically notified the Petitioner that the Court was not bound by the agreement[.]"
Answer,
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the Court is not bound. That calls for a "yes," "no" or "not applicable" response. Mr. Murray
did not respond because "Mr. Martens specifically told me that paragraph 11 did not apply to me
because I was only to be sentenced to 120 days." See Exhibit B to Petition. In fact, Mr. Murray
answered every applicable question and acknowledged every "Statement of Rights &
Explanation of Waivers by Plea of Guilty" except paragraph 11. Since the State has failed to
produce any evidence contradicting Mr. Murray's verified allegations and unchallenged Exhibits
regarding the above, there is no genuine question of fact as to this cause of action, summary
disposition should be granted and the Court should permit Mr. Murray to withdraw his guilty
plea.
B. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing
Hearings Was Constitutionally Ineffective under Estrada v. State and State v. Wood.
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; I.C. § 19-852. In general, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed
under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard. In order to prevail
under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it
fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and 2) that this deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The
prejudice prong of the test is shown ifthere is a reasonable probability that a different result
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would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
In this case, counsel was ineffective under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833
(2006), because counsel did not infonn Mr. Murray of the rights he was required to waive by the
Court and under the tenns of the plea agreement. While the guilty plea questionnaire infonned
Mr. Murray that he was waiving his rights under "State v. Estrada," trial counsel never explained
to Mr. Murray what those rights were. Thus, when the Court ordered that a domestic violence
evaluation be done and submitted to the Court Mr. Murray was not aware that he had any choice
but to submit to the evaluation. Further, he believed the waiver - whatever it involved - was of
no consequence because the Court could not sentence him to more than 120 days ofjail
of jail no
matter the result.
The record shows that the Court, at the change of plea hearing, asked if there was an

Estrada waiver, but never ensured that Mr. Murray understood what he was giving up. The
transcript shows the following:
THE COURT: Okay, is there an Estrada waiver?
MS. BUTTRAM: I believe so.
THE COURT: Well I think there would have to be. I'm not going to take it without an
Estrada waiver.
MR. MARTENS: Just a Moment, let me talk to the prosecutor.
(Brief delay.)
MR. MARTENS: Yes, that's fine. He will waive, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is that what you want to do, Mr. Murray?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
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Exhibit A to the Petition, pg. 7, In. 25 - pg. 8, In. 13. There is no indication in the above that

/l

defense counsel was informing Mr. Murray about the meaning of the waiver. He seeks a

J\

Further, trial counsel did not obtain an independent, confidential domestic violence

\.3,' ~.~ evaluation prior to the entry of the guilty plea and never explained to Mr. Murray that he had a
\j~ right to obtain his own domestic violence evaluation which would not be released to the Court
(

without his permission. Mr. Murray's allegation that he would have obtained his own
confidential domestic violence evaluation had he been so informed has not been contradicted by
the State in any meaningful way.
Trial counsel's performance with respect to the Estrada waiver and failure to object to
the court-ordered, non-confidential evaluation was deficient under State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,
100, 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998). In Wood, the defendant pleaded guilty and at the change of plea
hearing the Court ordered that the report of a defense expert, which had not yet been prepared, be
included in the presentence investigation report. Defense counsel did not object. On appeal, the
Supreme Court found the failure to object to the inclusion of the report was deficient
performance because "in this case the report had not been written, and [counsel] did not know
whether it would be favorable or unfavorable." 132 Idaho at 101,967 P.2d at 716. The same is
true here, defense counsel did not know whether the evaluation would be favorable or
unfavorable and should not have allowed Mr. Murray to participate in the evaluation.
The Wood Court also noted that "[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist had been appointed by
the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood would have had the
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opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the infonnation and of the privilege
against self-incrimination. In the context in which this report was prepared, Wood and his
attorney were deprived ofthis opportunity." Id. Likewise here, counsel should have advised Mr.
Murray of his right to obtain an independent, confidential evaluation and of his right to remain
silent and to not participate in a non-confidential report. (Indeed, the Court's Guilty Plea
Advisory Fonn does not require defendants to submit to non-confidential evaluations. To the
contrary, it says "I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the
right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering questions
or providing information that may increase my sentence." Exhibit B, pg. 1 [emphasis added].)
Thus, counsel should have obtained a confidential evaluation before advising Mr. Murray to
accept the state's settlement offer.
This deficient perfonnance prejudiced Mr. Murray. The court-ordered evaluation was
highly unfavorable to Mr. Murray and the Court relied, in part, upon Mr. Wilson's conclusions in
rejecting the negotiated sentencing recommendation and imposing a substantial prison sentence.
Further, had Mr. Murray been aware ofthe possibility that the Court could use the evaluation in
reaching a decision whether to send him to prison he would not have accepted a settlement
agreement where he was required to waive his right to a confidential evaluation.
As the State has failed to produce any evidence contradicting Mr. Murray's verified
allegations or challenging the Exhibits attached to the Petition, there is no genuine question of
material fact regarding this cause of action. The Court should grant the motion, vacate the
sentence and place Mr. Murray on probation.

6·

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §19-4906(c)

000070

c.

The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing
of Fact and Failed to Present Readily
Hearings Failed to Correct Material Misunderstandings ofFact
A vailable and Relevant Evidence.
In addition, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to correct mistakes in the courtordered evaluation and misunderstandings at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel was in
possession of the court-ordered evaluation prior to sentencing. However, counsel did not review
the evaluation with Mr. Murray. Nor did he contact Mr. Wilson or take any actions to try to
correct factual mistakes in the court-ordered evaluation. Nor did he inform Mr. Murray that he
could get another evaluation to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation.
Further, defense counsel did not go over the Presentence Investigation Report with Mr.
Murray until the morning of sentencing. Mr. Murray was given the PSI shortly before the
sentencing hearing and did not have enough time to review it prior to sentencing. Defense
counsel did not inform Mr. Murray that he could seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing so
he could go over the PSI with counsel.
All the above was deficient performance on the part of defense counsel because it allIed
to the following.
First, counsel did not attempt to impeach the credibility of Regina Murray's statements.
For example, it was public knowledge that she had been charged with domestic assault against
her boyfriend, Greg Evans, for throwing things at him and threatening him with a tire iron.
Further, she was charged in August of 2009 with aggravated assault for threatening her
boyfriend's mother with a kitchen knife. However, the Court was not made aware of these
pending charges. Mr. Murray's wife's credibility was important because the Court found that he
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had engaged in a pattern of "extreme sadistic behavior toward partners." Mr. Wilson also used
the statements in reaching his conclusions. See Wilson Report, pg. 7. However, those
accusations only come from the uncorroborated statements ofMr. Murray's estranged wife who
was facing aggravated assault and domestic violence charges at the time of sentencing (and who
is currently facing a murder charge).
Second, counsel did not inform the Court that it was mistaken about other important facts
during sentencing. In particular, counsel did not correct the following:
• The Court stated that Mr. Murray had engaged in "prior incidents of domestic
violence" and "stalking behavior of other girlfriends or significant others." Sentencing
Transcript, pg. 33, In. 8-12. Neither ofthese statements are correct. Mr. Murray's wife
made such accusations to the police but later recanted.
• Mr. Murray's wife told the police that the photographs were of consensual behavior,
not of domestic violence.
• The PSI does not state that Mr. Murray stalked other girlfriends or significant others.
• While the Court mentions four times during the sentencing that Mr. Murray has
"violated past protection order~," there is only one conviction for violating a protection
order and there are no other instances (emphasis in quotation added).
Mr. Murray was prejudiced by counsel's failure to adequately prepare for the sentencing
hearing because had he corrected those mistakes the Court would have followed the plea
agreement.
Since the state has failed to produce any evidence contradicting Mr. Murray's verified
allegations or challenging the authenticity of the exhibits attached to the Petition, there is no
genuine question of fact as to this cause of action. Summary disposition should be granted and
the Court should vacate the sentence and place Mr. Murray on probation.
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of the Deficient Performance Above
D. Alternatively, the Cumulative Effect ofthe
of the Effective Assistance of Counsel at
Prejudiced the Petitioner and Thus Deprived Him ofthe
of the Sixth Amendment Under Strickland v. Washington.
Trial in Violation ofthe
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to
each example of deficient perfonnance and detennine whether it was individually prejudicial.
Instead, the Court should consider all the deficient perfonnance and then detennine whether the
cumulative effect was prejudicial. See Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917
App.1994).
(Ct. App. 1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.l994).
"Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether their cumulative
effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in other words, not
di fferent aspects of a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial
separate claims, but rather different
counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9 th Cir. 2003).
counseL"
So, even if the Court does not find that each example of deficient perfonnance was
prejudicial individually, it must still grant relief because the cumulative effect of the deficient
perfonnance meets the second Strickland prong. As set forth above, there is a reasonable
probability of a different result had counsel's perfonnance not been deficient.

E. Conclusion.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant summary disposition in favor of
Mr. Murray and: 1) pennit Mr. Murray to withdraw his guilty plea and set the matter for trial; or
2) withhold judgment and place Mr. Murray on probation or, 3) alternatively, modify the
sentence of ten years with three years fixed by suspending that sentence and placing Mr. Murray
on probation.
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this2 LfJay of January, 2011.
Respectfully submitted this2Lf'Jay

~~eA~Dennis Benjamin
\
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this&~ of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be:

X mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., #3191
Boise, ID 83702
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FEB 09 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-2010-21310
Case No. CV-PC-2010-21310
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

------------)
---------------------------)

COMES NOW, Respondent, the State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of
record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and files this in response to
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition.
The Petitioner's guilty plea should not be vacated. Mr. Jared Martens, counsel of
record for the Petitioner at the time he entered his guilty plea, did not inform the
defendant that the Court had to go along with the plea agreement. Per his affidavit, filed
contemporaneously herewith, Mr. Martens did not make any representations of this sort
as this plea agreement had not been reduced to writing in a Rule 11 format. The State
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (MURRAY CVPC2010
CVPC201021310), Page 1
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requests an evidentiary hearing on this matter as there is a genuine issue of material fact
with regards to this allegation in the Motion.
The State agrees, after consultation with Mr. Martens, that counsel did not
communicate to the Petitioner about his Estrada rights by name. The plea agreement
called for the Petitioner to waive these rights, and to cooperate with the domestic violence
evaluation.

Counsel advised Petitioner to participate in the pre-sentence process,

apparently to include the evaluation. Counsel advised the Petitioner that cooperation was
a good idea.

The Petitioner should have been fully informed as to what these two

components meant, including the implications of the waiver of his rights and agreement
to an evaluation. Accordingly the State does not object to the Court granting a hearing on
the manner in which Mr. Martens advised his client. In the event the Court rules in favor
of the Petitioner and fmds that re-sentencing is appropriate, the State submits the proper
remedy is a new sentencing hearing, not modifying his sentence from imposition to
probation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This

-.:i day of February 2011.
-1
GREG H. BOWER
da County Prosecuting Attorney

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CVPC2010RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (MURRAY CVPC2010
21310), Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~tty of February 2011, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION to: Dennis Benjamin, Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, 303 W.
Bannock, PO Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83701, by depositing in the U.S. mail, postage
prepaid.

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (MURRAY CVPC2010
CVPC201021310), Page 3
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fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
IN
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN
fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE
JEFFREY MURRAY,

)
)
)
Case No. CV-PC-2010-21310
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF
) JARED MARTENS
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

--------------)
-----------------------------)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss
)

says :
Jared Martens, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a defense attorney licensed to practice in the State of Idaho.
Idaho .

2.

I represented Jeffrey Murray in the criminal case CR-FE-2009-0006l 02.

3.

I negotiated with the State a plea agreement that called for Mr. Murray to be

placed on felony probation with the State capping their recommendation for jail at 120
days..
days

4.

I never told Mr. Murray that this was a sentence he was guaranteed to receive.

5.
5.

I never told Mr. Murray that the Court was bound to follow this
recommendation by the State.

6.

This was not a Rule 11 plea agreement, so I would not have told Mr. Murray
that the Court had to follow the State's recommendation.

7.

I did tell Mr. Murray that we were free to ask the Court to impose a lesser
sentence.

8.
8.

I would not have told Mr. Murray that paragraph 11 of the guilty plea
questionnaire did not apply to him because this was not a Rule 11 plea
agreement.

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED MARTENS
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9.

•

Part of the agreement between Mr. Murray and the State required that Mr.
Murray participate in a Domestic Violence evaluation.

10.

Part of the agreement between Mr. Murray and the State required that Mr.
Murray waive his rights under Estrada v. State, and that he cooperate with the
Pre-Sentence Investigation.

11.

I did not fully explain to Mr. Murray what ''waiving his Estrada rights"
meant-rather, I told him it would be a good idea for him to cooperate with
the Pre-Sentence Investigation.

12.

I did not advise Mr. Murray to obtain an independent, confidential domestic
violence evaluation.

FURTHER Affiant sayeth not.
4"'1
DATED this
day of February 2011.

Z£-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to en e me this

AFFIDAVIT OF JARED MARTENS

~ay of February, 2011.
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

:.~. ____Fll,~.tfw.J
Fll,~.tfw"
1 6 2011
FEB 16
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
PAT:lICIAA. DWONCH
By PATilICIAA.
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-2010-213 10
CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310

REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, submits the following in reply to the State's Response to
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition.

A. The Plea o/Guilty Should Be Vacated Because it Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently
and Voluntarily Made.
Mr. Murray accepts the State's concession that an evidentiary hearing is required on
whether the guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. However, summary disposition
should be granted as to the other issues as will be explained below.
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B. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing
Hearings Was Constitutionally Ineffective Under Estrada v. State and State v. Wood.
1. Counsel was ineffective under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833
(2006).

Trial counsel concedes in his affidavit that he "did not fully explain to Mr. Murray what
'waiving his Estrada rights' meant - rather [he] told him it would be a good idea for him to
cooperate with the Pre-Sentence Investigation." Affidavit, pg. 2. That, of course, is precisely the
advice Mr. Estrada's attorney gave him which was found to be deficient by the Idaho Supreme
Court. Further, trial counsel frankly admits that he "did not advise Mr. Murray to obtain an
independent, confidential domestic violence evaluation." Id. Thus, the deficient performance
prong of Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), has been established.
In order to establish prejudice, all Mr. Murray must demonstrate is that there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the domestic violence evaluation, the sentence would have
been more favorable to him. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2009). A
reasonable probability does not mean "more likely than not"; it means a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693-94. Summary disposition is
appropriate in this case because it is beyond dispute that the Court relied upon the domestic
violence evaluation prepared by Mr. Wilson in rejecting the State's sentencing recommendation
and imposing the underlying prison sentence instead of suspending it. The Court stated, in this
regard, that:
Tom Wilson also engaged in a fairly extensive investigation into a domestic
violence in the defendant's past. Tom Wilson concludes from the information
that he obtains that the defendant minimizes the extent of his past violence.
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He may have alcohol issues, which he minimizes, because there are some
indications that some of the violence and abuse occurs in the context of alcohol
abuse.
Tom Wilson concludes he does have poor impulse control. He does additional
checking, additional verification. He, of course, brings all the information to the
attention of the defendant, who says that he last engaged in, or he terms as rough
sex, and Tom Wilson concludes that the defendant is of medium to high risk to
reoffend.

Transcript, pg. 34, In. 14 - pg. 35, In. 6.
Since the State concedes deficient performance and the record demonstrates prejudice,
summary disposition in favor of Mr. Murray should be granted on this issue.
2. Counsel was ineffective under State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100,967 P.2d 702,
714 (1998).
The State does not address Mr. Murray's contention that trial counsel was ineffective
under State v. Wood, supra, and apparently concedes the point. Thus, summary disposition
should be granted as to this issue.
C. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing
Hearings Failed to Correct Material Misunderstandings ofFact
of Fact and Failed to Present Readily
A vailable and Relevant Evidence,
Evidence.

The State also fails to address this issue in its response. Summary disposition should be
granted as to this claim for the reasons set forth in the memorandum in support of the motion.
D. Alternatively, the Cumulative Effect ofthe
of the Deficient Peiformance Above
Prejudiced the Petitioner and Thus Deprived Him ofthe
of the Effective Assistance ofCounsel
of Counsel at
Trial in Violation ofthe
of the Sixth Amendment Under Strickland v. Washington.

This Court should hold that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's Estrada error, Woods
error and trial counsel's failure to correct material misunderstandings of fact and failure to
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present readily available and relevant mitigation evidence was prejudicial under Strickland. As
previously argued, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had counsel's
performance not been deficient.

E. Conclusion.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant summary disposition in favor of
Mr. Murray on Issues B and C as alleged in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and
it should grant an evidentiary hearing as to Issue A.
Respectfully submitted this J

&~ay of February, 2011.

~~:e~~~~~~~Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing document to be:

~~ of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct
~~

l-mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., #3191
Boise,ID 83702

CkNA~~~
Dennis Benjamin

\
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

APR 07 2011
CH;:;:9' •. h-;;: ,; n. hICH.
hlCH, Clerk
CHi':;:9'
61 KA'••
KA" ••-iY
-IV Bl.:::ii'_
Bl.:::n'_
Deputy

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310

MOTION TO ORDER CASE TO
MEDIATION OR SET HEARING ON
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, moves this Court for an Order referring this case for
mediation. Alternatively, it should set the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition for a
hearing. This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(2) and (4)(A) which gives the Court
authority to order post"conviction
post..,conviction cases to mediation upon motion by a party.
Mr. Murray filed his petition on October 27, 2010 and the State filed a timely Answer.
On January 24, 2011,
20 II, Mr. Murray filed his Motion for Summary Disposition and a Memorandum
of Law in support thereof. The State filed a response to the motion on February 9,2011 and Mr.
Murray filed a reply brief on February 16, 2011. Since then, counsel's office has contacted the
Court but has not been successful in obtaining a hearing date for the motion.
1
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This case is appropriate for mediation because the State has conceded that trial counsel's
performance was deficient under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) and
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Further, the record of the criminal proceeding
establishes the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. It clearly shows that the Court relied upon
the domestic violence evaluation prepared by Mr. Wilson in rejecting the State's sentencing
recommendation and imposing the underlying prison sentence instead of suspending it. See,
Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2009).
Since the State concedes deficient performance and the record demonstrates prejudice,
Mr. Murray has asked that summary disposition be granted on this issue. However, the remedy
for an Estrada violation is a new sentencing hearing. So, mediation to see if the parties can
agree upon an appropriate sentence is called for in this case. As Mr. Murray has already served
19 months of his 3-year fixed term (after a plea agreement for a joint recommendation of 120
days of county jail and probation), further delay in resentencing may deny him any meaningful
remedy in his case. Moreover, if the parties can reach a sentencing agreement which the Court
follows, Mr. Murray would be willing to dismiss the remaining claims in the petition, including
that counsel was ineffective under State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100, 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998),
and that the guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily as required by
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should either order the case to mediation or set
a hearing on the pending Motion for Summary Disposition.
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Respectfully submitted this

71" day of April, 2011.

•

~!~~
~~~~
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
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Tessie Buttram
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., #3191
Boise, ID 83702
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APR 11 2011

Dennis Benjamin
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, Idaho 8370
83701I
(208) 343-1000

'lRSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATHY BIEHL
~

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STA
TE OF IDAHO,
STATE
Respondent.

CV-PC-2010-21310
Case No. CV-PC-2010-213
10

NOTICE OF HEARING

Pursuant to the directive ofthe Court, a hearing for Post Conviction Relief in the above
entitled action will be held on the 31 st day of May, 2011, at the hour of9:30 a.m., before the
Honorable Deborah Bail, at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, or as soon thereafter as
counsel may be heard.

I

Dated this J "day of April, 2011.

G~.~PA~
'
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Defendant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~ay
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~mailed
faxed
hand delivered
to: Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, 200 West Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702

Dennis Benjamin
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FILED
Tuesday. April 12.2011 at 10:45 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JEFFREY MURRAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

Case No. CV-PC-201O-2131O

ORDER TO TRANSPORT

Inmate # 93929
It appearing that the above-named plaintiff is in the custody of the Idaho State Board of
Correction, and that it is necessary that JEFFREY MURRAY be brought before this Court for:

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING ........Tuesday,
........ Tuesday, May 31,2011

@

9:30 AM

It is THEREFORE ORDERED That the Ada County Sheriff bring the Plaintiff from the

Penitentiary to the Court at said time and on said date;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That immediately following said Court appearance the Sheriff will
return the said Plaintiff to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction until the court orders
otherwise;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Idaho State Board of Correction release the said Plaintiff
to the Ada County Sheriff for the purpose of the aforementioned appearance and await further order of
the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of this Court serve a copy hereof upon the Idaho
State Board of Correction forthwith and certify to the same.

Dated this Tuesday, April 12, 2011.

DEBORAH A. BAIL
DISTRICT JUDGE

Order to Transport
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CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE @UT'l
@UT'I
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

) Case No.: CV-PC-201O-2131O
)
) DECISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Jeffrey Dane Murray filed a petition for post-conviction relief on October 27, 2010. An
evidentiary hearing was held on May 31,2011. The petitioner was represented by his counsel,
Dennis Benjamin. At the outset, both sides stipulated that the Court could take judicial notice of
the files and records in the underlying criminal case, including the presentence report. The State
was represented by its counsel, Tessie Buttram. Based upon the evidence at the hearing, the
Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

I.
Findings of Fact
1. On April 3, 2009, the police responded to a call where a woman was having trouble breathing.

Upon questioning, the woman said that her boyfriend had been angry with her because he
thought she was seeing another man. He slapped her and then choked her until she began
coughing and having difficulty breathing. She said that she went into the bathroom and began
coughing up blood. The officer observed that her throat looked sore and swollen. Her
boyfriend, Jeffrey Dane Murray, said that they were fooling around, having "rough sex" and he
might have grabbed her neck. He also told the officer that she had passed out "four times" and
that he had "brought her back." As a result of the investigation, Jeffrey Dane Murray was
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charged in an Amended Information filed June 1,2009 with two charges: a felony offense of
Attempted Strangulation and a misdemeanor Battery.
2. The petitioner was arraigned on June 1, 2009 and advised of his rights, the maximum
possible penalty for both offenses, and confirmed that he was prosecuted under his true name.
He stated that he understood his rights. His case was continued for entry of a plea. At the
arraignment, he was represented by his private counsel, Jared Martens who represented him
throughout the trial proceedings in his criminal case.
3. On July 13, 2009, a Second Amended Information was filed charging the sole offense of
Domestic Violence, a felony. The Second Amended Information was filed as part of a plea
bargain agreement in which the State agreed, in exchange for his plea to a Domestic Violence
felony charge, to dismiss the Attempted Strangulation and Battery charges. The State agreed to
recommend a sentence of three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate for a ten year
sentence, suspended, and to ask for one hundred and twenty days jail. The plea bargain
agreement was not a binding Rule 11 agreement and the Court was not bound to follow it. The
defendant agreed to waive his rights under Estrada v. State and to cooperate fully with a
domestic violence evaluation, an alcohol evaluation and the presentence report. The petitioner
and his trial counsel consented to the filing of the Second Amended Information at the July 13,
2009 hearing. The Court expressly asked the petitioner ifhe was giving an Estrada waiver. His
counsel stated that he would. Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13, 2009, pg.s 7-8.
4. As part of his guilty plea examination, the petitioner was examined by the Court in open court
and also presented a signed written Guilty Plea Advisory form. He read, initialed his rights in
the Statement of Rights, answered forty-three questions and signed the written Guilty Plea
Advisory Form on July 13, 2009. The petitioner is forty-seven years old. The petitioner not
only reads and writes the English language but has a high school degree and some college
education. He stated, both on the form and in open court, that he had not taken any medications
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and that he understood the proceedings and his counsel. The Guilty Plea Advisory fonn
specifically advised on page one in the Statement of Rights:

2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to
the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under State v. Estrada.
Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after pleading guilty, you will still
have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any infonnation that might
tend to show you committed other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide
any infonnation that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s)
crime( s) to which you
are pleading guilty.

The petitioner initialed this paragraph as instructed by the Guilty Plea Advisory Fonn. After the
petitioner was sworn, the Court again advised him of his rights, and then stated:

"Q. (The Court) And you understand you are giving up your rights under State v.
Estrada, and that means that you cannot refuse to answer any question or provide any
infonnation that might tend to show you committed some other crime? You need to talk
freely and openly with the presentence investigator and with any domestic violence
evaluator about any problems that you might have that might have a bearing upon
sentencing.
A. (The petitioner) Yes, ma'am.

Q. And you are aware of that?
A (The petitioner) Yes, ma'am.
Q. Okay. Now, did you have any problems understanding questions on the guilty
plea advisory fonn?
A. (The petitioner) No, ma'am."
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Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13,2009, pg.s 16-17.
5. At the time he plead guilty, the petitioner was specifically asked ifhe had any questions
before he was asked to provide a factual basis for his plea. He was also asked ifhe had had
enough time to talk to his lawyer and he replied that he had. He stated that he was not having
any trouble understanding the guilty plea proceedings nor had he had any trouble understanding
his lawyer.
6. The Guilty Plea Advisory Form which the petitioner stated that he understood and signed
provided the following information at paragraph 11:
I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This means
that the court is not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and
may impose any sentence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence for any
offense. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not
to follow the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.
7. Throughout the plea hearing, the State's sentencing offer was referred to multiple times as a
"recommendation." Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13,2009, pg. 7. The petitioner's counsel put
on the record that the defense was free to argue for less. Id. The petitioner was asked multiple
times ifhe was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, ifhe had enough time talk to his lawyer
and to think about his plea. He replied that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and that
he had had enough time to talk to his lawyer. He was asked ifhe had any trouble understanding
the guilty plea proceedings and replied that he was not. Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13, 2009,
pg. 14. He also informed the Court that he had enough time to think about his plea and that he
had had enough time to talk to his lawyer. Id. He was asked ifthere was anything else he
wanted his lawyer to do that he had not done and he replied "No, ma'am." Tr. Guilty Plea
pg.l5. On the signature page of the Guilty Plea Advisory form,
Hearing, July 13,2009, pg.15.
immediately above the petitioner's signature was the following:
I have answered the questions on each page of this Guilty Plea Advisory form
truthfully, I understand all of the questions and answers in this form, and I have discussed
each question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and
voluntarily. Furthermore no one has threatened me to do so.
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8. On September 15, 2009, the Court imposed a sentence ofthree years fixed followed by seven
years indeterminate for a ten year sentence but did not place the petitioner on probation. The
crime itself was serious and the pre-sentence investigation uncovered an extensive and longlong
standing pattern of troubling domestic violence. The Court did not follow the State's
recommendation for a suspended sentence. The petitioner moved to have his sentence reduced
on December 8,2009. The State opposed the motion. The Court denied the motion for
reconsideration on January 29,2010 and the petitioner thereafter appealed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Order denying his motion for sentence reduction in an unpublished opinion
filed November 1, 2010.
9. The defendant had a past record for violation of a no contact order, and domestic violence in
Illinois in 2002. The presentence investigator found NCIC records showing a protection order
barring him from contact with N.S. and another order prohibiting a GC from having contact with
him. He had a conviction in Tennessee involving a Regina Murray, his ex-wife. There were
frequent reports of extreme violence directed at her. Police reports recounted that he had pushed
her on her back, slapped her, put a knife to her neck and chest and said "I believe I want some
blood tonight." The report when onto to state that he then cut her left breast, causing it to bleed,
and had sex with the victim while she was crying. The victim was contacted and verified that the
information was accurate but she did not wish to press charges because she was afraid of
retaliation. The investigating officer at the time the incident occurred had observed the marks on
the victim's breasts from the incident and had photographed them. The victim did not continue
the prosecution so charges were dropped. Another police report arose from a photo department
at a retail store reporting pornographic photos showing a bound woman with blood around her
nose and mouth, hands purple from the bindings on her hands, and what appeared to be a tattoo
stating "Murrays property." The were other photos showing injuries and blood spattering. The
investigating officer traced the photos back to the petitioner and confirmed that the victim was
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Regina Murray. Regina Murray was contacted, continned that it was her, and indicated to the
detective that she did not wish to prosecute. When contacted by the presentence investigator, she
told the investigator that the acts were not consensual. The petitioner admitted to carving letters
on his ex-wife's breasts but asserted that his behavior was consensual. A police investigator
contacted by the presentence investigator described the petitioner showing him extremely
troubling photographs showing domestic brutality. The petitioner's ex-wife also described a
pattern of cruelty. Two women previously involved with the petitioner would not provide a
statement for inclusion into the presentence report because they were afraid of retaliation. The
petitioner minimized his involvement in the instant case and denied other domestic violence but
the presentence investigator, after a thorough investigation into mUltiple
multiple other incidents,
concluded that the petitioner was dangerous and was unlikely to succeed on probation. The
presentence investigator, based upon the analysis of independent sources, concluded that a prison
sentence was the appropriate disposition.
10. The petitioner minimized his responsibility throughout the presentence report and denied
any violence other than "rough sex." He reported that he had been diagnosed with an "antisocial
disorder" and anxiety. In the presentence report, he stated that the victim had been angry at him
and that "she said" he grabbed her throat and he "agreed to this." He said she went to the rest
room and gagged, "spit up blood and left room." He said he had to revive her four times. He
said elsewhere in the report that he and the victim were "fooling around" and had "rough sex"
and he "might" have grabbed her neck when they were "rolling around in bed" but that he did
not remember squeezing her throat although maybe he did it. The petitioner did admit to carving
his initials on his ex-wife's breasts but asserted it was consensual. He insisted that all violent
contacts with his ex-wife were consensual and that his behavior was nonnal. He felt that the
prior women in his life were angry at him and trying to get back at him and were unstable. He
reported that he was a hard worker with a good childhood and a good family background. He did
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not report any alcohol or drug problems. He felt that the factors contributing to his criminal
conduct were "bad choice of a life partner" and "not staying up to date on current laws" and felt
that he should be given probation. Other than stating that he had carved his initials into the
breasts of his ex-wife with her consent and that he "agreed" to the victim's statement that he
grabbed her throat, the petitioner did not make any incriminating statements in the presentence
report.
11. The petitioner did not make any incriminating statements in the domestic battery evaluation.
He described the offense in a way similar to the way he did for the presentence investigator:

"she said 1 grabbed her by the throat for five seconds." (emphasis added). His reports ofthe
offense were always couched with "she said that" something happened; nothing was ever stated
as: "I did" something.

He told the evaluator that he had to revive her four times after she

passed out. His lengthier description does not include any action by him except his thoughtful
efforts to revive her after she inexplicably passed out. He did say that in the past they had been
into strangulation and rough sex. He denied any prior violence. The evaluator was aware of
police reports involving incidents of domestic violence with other partners. The petitioner did
advise the evaluator that he had completed anger management classes as a result of his 2002
charges. He minimized all improper conduct and did not express remorse nor did he feel he was
in need of treatment. He had not been using alcohol or other substances at the time of the
underlying incident. He said he might have put his hands around the victim's throat but denied
any intent to harm her. The evaluator concluded that he lacked empathy, was not motivated for
treatment and presented a medium to high risk for domestic violence. However, the petitioner
himself made no incriminating statements that are detailed in the domestic battery evaluation.
12. In this hearing, the petitioner contradicted himself when he was not being lead excessively
by his counsel to make the "right" answers. After initially saying that he only heard about the
plea bargain on the day of sentencing, the petitioner said that he was first advised ofthe plea
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bargain agreement at the time of his arraignment. He was arraigned on June 1,2009 in district
court. He said he discussed the plea offer at that point. He also said that he read the Guilty Plea
Advisory form and was given a recess to do it but now asserts that he did not go over the form
closely. He said that he did read paragraph 11 but that his lawyer said that it was not binding.
He said he did not know what it meant on the form that he would waive his rights under State v.
Estrada.

13. I do not believe that his lawyer told him paragraph 11 was not binding. Moreover, unlike
the initial Statement of Rights in the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, there is no requirement that any
other statement or answer in the form in use at that time be initialed so it is irrelevant that the
petitioner did not initial paragraph 11 since he was not required or expected to do so.
14. The petitioner's counsel at the time of the underlying proceedings was Jared Martens. He
reviewed all of the discovery with his client. He engaged in plea bargain negotiations with the
prosecutor and was able to get the charge of Attempted Strangulation reduced to Domestic
Violence and to get the misdemeanor dismissed. Part of the plea agreement, was that the
petitioner would get a domestic violence evaluation which was required by law. He never told
the petitioner that the Court was bound to follow the State's recommendations. He stated that
the petitioner was aware that the plea agreement was not a binding Rule 11 plea. He admitted
that he did not explain Estrada rights to the petitioner. In fact, he told the petitioner it would be
a good idea to cooperate with the presentence investigator. He was aware that the petitioner
would be likely to continue in his denials that any domestic violence occurred. He is very clear
that he did tell the petitioner that the plea agreement was not binding on the Court. He also
... state cap recs to 3+ 7, NCO w/victim...(defendant)
w/victim ... (defendant)
wrote in the Guilty Plea Advisory form: " ...state
may argue less. Cooperate w/psi.'" Mr. Martens was consistent throughout that he told the

I In the original Guilty Plea Advisory Form, all of the petitioner's answers and his signature are in blue ink. The
only portion in black ink is the recitation of the plea bargain agreement written in by his counsel, Mr. Martens. The
maximum possible sentence is written as "10 yrs" and is in blue ink. Whether he wrote it or not, the petitioner was
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petitioner that the plea bargain agreement was non-binding which was why the defense could
argue for less. The written reference to the plea bargain agreement and the term used throughout
the guilty plea examination was that the State would make a "recommendation" for a sentence of
three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate, suspended, and one hundred and twenty
days in the Ada County j ail. The repeated references to "recommend" do not support the
petitioner's current assertion that he had a binding sentencing agreement. The petitioner was
well aware that the Court could go over the State's recommendation according to the petitioner's
counsel whom I believe on this point. While I believe that the petitioner fervently hoped the
Court would go along with the plea bargain or do less, I do not find it credible at all that the
petitioner was unaware that the plea bargain agreement was not binding. It was explained to him
clearly in the Guilty Plea Advisory form and in open court and I do not believe his current
version at the evidentiary hearing in this matter. It was also his then attorney's general practice
to advise his clients that the State's recommendation is just a recommendation and that the Court
could go above or below it. His counsel pointed out that the non-binding nature of the agreement
was also clear because he was hoping to get the Court to go below the State's recommendations.
His counsel also denies the petitioner's strange assertion that he told the petitioner the case could
be tried up to two or more times after he was found not guilty by a jury. The petitioner's
testimony is not credible. He was led extensively throughout the evidentiary hearing to give the
desired answer, including after times when he responded "incorrectly." Mr. Martens went over
the presentence report with the petitioner prior to the sentencing hearing and got letters of
recommendation to submit for the hearing. His strategy at the sentencing hearing was to admit
that the petitioner had flaws but to argue that they were not severe. There is no evidence that any
evaluation by any other person would have made any difference in the information presented to

advised of the maximum possible sentence by his counsel and the top of the sentence in the plea bargain agreement
was listed as ten years.
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the Court: the petitioner minimized the strangulation incident at the heart of the case in a
consistent manner in both the presentence report and the domestic violence evaluation. He, no
doubt, would have done the same had his counsel hired another evaluator.
15. The petitioner throughout the underlying proceedings and in this proceeding comes across as
an intelligent person. Certainly at the hearing on his post conviction proceeding, he picked up
very quickly on his attorney's cues that he had not answered "correctly." He is an intelligent
person who went through both an examination by the Court in open court on his guilty plea and a
mUlti-page guilty plea advisory form. He specifically stated, at the time he plead guilty, that he
multi-page
had both enough time to think about his plea and enough time to talk to his lawyer. While his
lawyer did not discuss State v. Estrada, the Court did, both in open court and in the written guilty
plea form. Based upon all of the evidence, I find that the petitioner was aware that he was
entering a non-binding plea agreement in which the Court could go above or below the State's
recommendations. I further find that the petitioner did not, in fact, incriminate himself in
uncharged criminal matters in the presentence report or the evaluation. The petitioner is an
intelligent, reasonably well-educated, mature adult who was not taking any medications nor
reporting any problems with his comprehension at the time he entered his guilty plea. I am
certain that he fervently hoped that his attorney would succeed in obtaining a lesser sentence for
him at the original sentencing proceeding and that the Court would suspend his sentence but I am
also certain that he knew the plea agreement was non-binding and, as it states in black and white
in the Guilty Plea Advisory form which he signed, that the Court could impose any sentence up
to the maximum that was authorized by law.
16. While the petition also challenged the representation of the petitioner's second counsel,
Joseph Ellsworth, no evidence at all was offered challenging any work that he did for the
petitioner.

000102
- 10

II.
Legal Analysis
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding,

and is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443,
180 P.3d 476,482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646
(2008). An applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v.

State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271,
61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002).
The petitioner has raised several grounds for post-conviction relief: the plea was not a
valid plea because it was not "knowing, intelligent and voluntary," he was not advised by his
attorney about his rights under Estrada v. State, that he should have gotten a confidential
domestic violence evaluation which would not have been released to the Court prior to the plea,
that he was not properly represented at the sentencing hearing because his attorney did not get an
evaluation which would rebut the court-ordered evaluation, that his attorney did not review the
excourt-ordered evaluation with him, that the information in the pre-sentence report from his ex
wife was not properly challenged and that there were other errors in the presentence report. He
alleges that counsel he hired right after the sentencing should have filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea and did not, that another positive evaluation should have been submitted in support of
his motion to modify his sentence under ICR 35. In sum, the petitioner contends that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea and at his sentencing.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is proper under the post-conviction procedure
act. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that the attorney's performance
was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by his attorney's inadequate performance.
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McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460,463 (2004); Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To show deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's
representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho
878,883, 187 P.3d 1253, 1258 (Ct. App. 2008). If a defendant succeeds in establishing that
counsel's performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Lastly, when evaluating an
secondineffective assistance of counsel claim, strategic and tactical choices should not be second
guessed. Id., at 686. It is presumed that counsel is competent and that trial tactics were based on
sound legal strategy. Id.
Before deciding whether to plead guilty, all defendants are entitled to "the effective
assistance of competent counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010).
Similarly, a defendant is entitled to his attorney's assistance when he decides to participate in
evaluations prepared for consideration at sentencing. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d
833 (2006). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, supra. To establish a deficiency, he has the burden of showing that his

attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel re: Guilty Plea.
For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered
into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. There are three areas which are focused
upon: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature
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of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of
pleading guilty. State v. Workman, 144 Idaho 518, 527, 164 P.3d 798, 807 (2007).
During the guilty plea hearing, the state noted that, pursuant to the plea agreement, the
state was going to amend the information "from felony attempted strangulation domestic battery
to one count of felony domestic violence." Guilty Plea Hearing Transcript, at 6. The petitioner's
attorney, Jared Martens, further noted that "[t]he rest of the agreement is that he would stipulate
to the elements of household member and traumatic injury, marks on the neck, he will waive his
right to appeal on those two elements. The state would cap its recommendation at three plus
seven, 120 days Ada County Jail, no contact with the victim, need to get a domestic violence and
alcohol evaluation. Restitution and costs are open. The defense is free to argue for less. And in
talking to the prosecutor, if he meets the requirements, they are not going to promote but not
object to a withheld judgment in this case." Id., at 7 (emphasis added).
The Court then clarified: "So he would plead guilty to the charge in the Second Amended
Information, and the State will ask for three years fixed, followed by seven years indeterminate,
for a ten year sentence, suspended, up to 120 days Ada County Jail, would get a domestic
violence evaluation and alcohol evaluation, and the State might not oppose a withheld." Id.
(Emphasis added). The petitioner testified under oath that his attorney had advised him the
consequences of his guilty plea. !d., at 15. He also testified that no one had promised him that
the court would be easy on him ifhe pleaded guilty and no one had offered him an incentive for
pleading guilty. Id., at 12. The petitioner also signed a guilty plea advisory form which
specifically stated:
"I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This
means that the court is not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations,
and may impose any sentence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence for any
offense. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not
to follow the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea."
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The fonn also provides that the petitioner's attorney "discussed in detail," the
infonnation in the guilty plea advisory fonn. In addition, the petitioner acknowledged, in signing
the fonn, that he understood all of the questions and answers in the fonn and had discussed each
question and answer with his attorney and that he completed the fonn freely and voluntarily. The
petitioner also testified that he had no problems understanding the guilty plea advisory fonn. !d.,
at 17. The petitioner now contends that he did not initial this portion ofthe guilty plea advisory
fonn because he believed that the court was required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement.
First, there was no requirement on the fonn to initial this paragraph. It was a plain English
advisory that the plea agreement was non-binding. The petitioner's assertion is also not
supported by his attorney's testimony nor by the other evidence in the record. Ifthis tenn were
not applicable, the provision would have been deleted or otherwise marked as inapplicable. It
was not. Moreover, this court does not accept plea agreements which bind the Court to a
particular sentence and it is abundantly clear from the plea discussion that the state was only
making recommendations and that the defense was free to argue for less. The guilty plea
advisory fonn plainly advised the petitioner that the plea agreement was non-binding and that
the court could impose any sentence up to the maximum possible sentence. Moreover, there was
nothing said during the hearing that would indicate that the court was bound to the sentencing
recommendations contained in the plea agreement. Both the state and the petitioner's attorney at
the time noted that these were sentencing recommendations. During the sentencing hearing, the
petitioner's attorney, Mr. Martens, also specifically stated that "we too would ask you that you
follow the agreement." Id., at 28. There would be no need for defense counsel (and the state) to
request the Court to follow the recommendations in the plea agreement, if the plea agreement
actually was intended to bind the court in reference to sentencing. It is also telling that there was
no argument made in the petitioner's Rule 35 motion that he was operating under the
misimpression that the Court was bound to the sentencing recommendations of the plea
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agreement. In short, the petitioner's assertions that he was unaware that the Court was not bound
by the terms of the plea agreement are flatly contradicted by the record in this case. The
petitioner's plea was valid.
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel re: Estrada; Evaluations and Sentencing.
1. Estrada. There is no question that the petitioner's counsel did not advise him of his
right to remain silent at the domestic violence evaluation as required by Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) nor did he discuss the consequences of waiving that right.
However, there is also no question that the Court did advise him of those rights on page one of
the Guilty Plea Advisory form. Specifically, he was advised:
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent about
the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial.
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to
the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under State v. Estrada.
Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after pleading guilty, you will still
have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any information that might
tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or
provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) to
which you are pleading guilty.
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the
right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering
questions or providing information that may increase my sentence.
The petitioner initialed both paragraphs. In the recent case of Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,
254 P.3d 69 (Ct. App., 2011), the Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue and held that,
while "it is preferable for counsel to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent and to
submitting to the evaluation," counsel is not ineffective for failing
discuss the consequences of SUbmitting
to re-advise his client after the trial court has done so. Since the Court in this case did advise the
petitioner of his rights under Estrada v. State prior to any participation in a domestic violence
evaluation or a presentence report, his attorney was not required to do so again. There is no
basis for post-conviction relief on this issue.
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2. Additional evaluations. Counsel at this proceeding has also contended that it was
ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel not to get another domestic violence evaluation
either before his plea for use by the defense or before sentencing. There was no showing of any
benefit from an additional evaluation at any stage of the proceedings. It is speculative that an
additional evaluation would have been of any use. In Gonzales v. State, supra., the Court of
Appeals held that there was no obligation to obtain a confidential defense evaluation to inform
the defense decision to participate in a court-ordered evaluation and that the failure to do so was
not ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that
his counsel was ineffective with respect to additional evaluations.
3. Sentencing. The petitioner had access to the presentence several days before the
hearing. No continuance was requested. A defendant's ability to dispute the findings and
statements in the presentence report at his or her sentencing hearing is guaranteed. State v. Gain,
140 Idaho 170, 174,90 P.3d 920, 924 (Ct. App. 2004); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d
(1) be afforded a full opportunity to present
898 (Ct. App. 1994). A defendant is entitled to (I)

favorable evidence; (2) be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the presentence report and
Id.
(3) be afforded a full opportunity to explain and rebut adverse evidence. ld.

The petitioner was given a copy ofthe presentence report before the hearing. He was
aware of his ex-wife's letter well prior to the hearing. His contention that he only learned about
the unfavorable information immediately before the hearing is not credible. On August 24,
2009, the Court had to continue the sentencing. At that hearing, petitioner's counsel stated that
he had the evaluation. On September 8, 2009, the hearing was held. At the outset, his attorney
was asked ifhe had changes or corrections to make to the presentence materials. His counsel
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replied that he was going to address any corrections in his argument. No additional time was
requested.
The petitioner claims that he was not permitted to rebut claims by his wife, and that
evidence that she was in j ail on pending murder charges was not introduced. First, it is
fundamental that charges are not evidence of guilt. It is not proper impeachment, even it were
true, to focus on charges against someone. A conviction can be admissible impeachment; a
charge is not. The petitioner asserts that counsel should have pointed out that the court was
mistaken about "important facts during sentencing," including prior incidents of domestic
violence and stalking behavior. The petitioner contends that the behavior reported by his wife
was consensual behavior, including the conduct depicted in the photographs. Both of these
points were raised at the sentencing hearing.
In this case, the petitioner did rebut, through counsel, many of the accusations against

him. At sentencing, his counsel described the allegations as "baseless," and went on to argue
that, "Quite simply, everything seems to be based on one letter and then expanded upon from
that one letter. It's a little disturbing to me." Sentencing Hearing Transcript, at 30. Mr. Martens
also mentioned that the wife was unavailable because she was "incarcerated." Id. The Court was
accordingly aware of the general outline ofthe petitioner's allegations, and made its sentencing
decision in light of that awareness. Moreover, since the petitioner's own statements that the
conduct was true but consensual, confirmed his wife's statements, the argument has no merit.
The petitioner was given sufficient time to review the report. His attorney made a tactical
decision to argue that, although there was troubling material in the report, that the petitioner was
in need of treatment which would address his problems. His attorney asked the Court to follow
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the plea bargain. When the petitioner was given the opportunity to speak, he said that he agreed
with his attorney.
c. Issues raised in the Petition but not supported by evidence.
The petitioner raised several claims in his petition asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel against Joe Ellsworth, the attorney he hired nine days after he was sentenced. Mr.
Ellsworth represented the petitioner in his appeal of the denial of his post-sentencing ICR 35
motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's denial of the motion for sentence reduction
in an unpublished opinion filed November 1,2010 in State v. Murray, Unpublished Opinion No.
693. The petitioner presented no evidence at all on his assertions that he asked Mr. Ellsworth to
file a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea, or to appeal his sentence or that he should have offered
some kind of additional evaluation in support of his motion to modify the sentence. No evidence
was offered on any claim raised against Mr. Ellsworth. As noted above, the petitioner bears the
burden of showing that he is entitled to post-conviction relief and where, he fails to produce
evidence in support of a claim, this Court will not address it nor grant relief based upon unproven
assertions. I.C. § 19-4907; Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 190 P.3d 905 (Ct. App. 2008); Loveland
v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2005). The fact that his application is verified
does not dispense with the requirement that he provide proof of his allegations. Loveland v.
State 141 Idaho at 936.

III.
Conclusion

The petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to post-conviction
relief. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as stated above, the
petitioner has the burden to show: (1) that his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) that
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•
he or she was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the criminal charge. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As noted previously, there is a strong presumption that
counsel's performance was adequate which must be overcome by evidence establishing that
counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence. If a petitioner succeeds
in establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, he or she must also prove the prejudice
element by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result ofthe proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A
Id.
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." [d.

Strategic and tactical choices are not second-guessed. The petitioner has failed to meet this
burden.
The petitioner entered a valid guilty plea which was "knowing, intelligent and voluntary."
His current assertions that he thought the plea bargain was a binding agreement are not credible.
The petitioner has failed to meet the burden of showing that his counsel's performance was
deficient, with the exception of his failure to advise him of his Estrada rights. He was not
prejudiced by this error because the Court advised petitioner of his Estrada rights. The
petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to post-conviction relief The
petition is dismissed.
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It is so ordere~
ordere~

Dated this

if!) day of October, 2011.
or
District Judge
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 2772
BOISE ID 83701

.. .......

" ,

",

Dated: Thursday, October 20, 2011

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of t e Court
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
w. Bannock
303 W.
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
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B2011
NOV f B2011
CHRISTOPHER 0
JAMIE
By JAMIe

RAN:'~H, Clerk

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-20IO-2I3IO

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofIdaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY,
the Ada County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK. OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Appellant, Jeffrey Murray, appeals against the above named
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment denying Appellant's petition for
post-conviction relief, entered in the above entitled action on the 20th day of October, 2011, the
Honorable Deborah A. Bail, presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l)
(a)(1)
I.A.R.
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.

1·

NOTICE OF APPEAL

000114

..
• Is the Court's decision based upon unreasonable determinations of fact in light
of the evidence presented?
• Is the Court's decision regarding the Strickland claim an unreasonable
application of controlling United States Supreme Court precedent?
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued.
5. Transcript:
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested.
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions
of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: Transcript of
evidentiary hearing held on May 31, 20 11 (estimated number of pages: 150).
6. The Appellant requests that a standard record be prepared pursuant to Rule 28(b)(1),
I.A.R.
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
(a) All exhibits offered and/or admitted at the evidentiary hearing.
8. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Susan Gambee, Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, ID 83702.
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because
he is indigent. A motion to proceed without payment of fees is being filed.
(c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because he is indigent.
(d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is
no filing fee for post-conviction petitions.
((e)
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1), Idaho
Code).

2·

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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DATED THIS

~

day of November, 2011.

~~
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray

3·

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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-,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
November.:2.\ ,2011, I caused a true and correct copy of the
I CERTIFY that on November.=2.\
foregoing document to be:

KK

mailed
hand delivered
faxed

to:

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front, Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Susan Gambee
Official Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

~~~~
Dennis Benjamin

4·

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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NO._=_
_~:::--~
NO·_=--1IiiTrl~hh'"""""ft-"L~~
PIL~~ ~
tt~

A.M.
A.M.

Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
w. Bannock
303 W.
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

NOV f 8 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL '
OEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
ST
ATE OF IDAHO,
STATE
Respondent-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-I021310
MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF THE STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER AND TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Jeffrey Murray asks this Court to issue an order appointing the Office of the State
Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and to pennit him to appeal without
payment of fees or costs. Good cause exists to grant this motion because Mr. Murray has
previously been found to be indigent by this Court and has filed a Notice of Appeal in this case.
This motion is based upon the Sixth and Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article
1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 19-4904.
DATED THIS

-r~~
r~~

day of November, 2011.

~~~~-Dennis BenjamillS
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray
1·

MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER AND TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

000118

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on November l~ ,2011, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

rc

mailed
hand delivered
faxed

to:

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front, Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
ID 83720-0010
Boise, 10
State Appellate Public Defender
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Ste. 100
Boise, ID 83703

UOM,,\S~-rDennis Benjamin
,

2·

MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER AND TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
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Dennis Benjamin
ISB# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208)345-8274 (f)

JAN 0 9 2012
i'-;ER D. RICH, Clerl~
CHR1STOF i'-iER
&y
fJy JERI HEPTON
OEPll,.
OEPI'"

Attorneys for the Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
COU1\1TY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUl'1TY
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-PC-2010-213l0
CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310
NOTICE OF FILING
APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC
DEFENDER
(piluJ
ef"'SiPJt}(piletl VR Jef"'SiPJt)

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, through his attorneys, submits the attached Application
for Public Defender, as required by the Court, in support of his Motion to Appoint State
Appellate Public Defender, filed on November 18,2011.
Respectfully submitted

this7~ay ofJanuary, 2012.

~~o.-;-~~o.-.;-Dennis Benjamin

1 •

NOTICE OF FILING APPLICAnON
APPLICA nON FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER (Fite&J.IuQQF

Seal~
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.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on
foregoing document to be:

January~

,2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the

mailed

.K:

hand delivered
faxed

to:

2·

Tessie Buttram
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front, Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702

NOTICE OF FILING APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER (Filed Under Seal)
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JAN 09 lOtZ

CASE NO. CV-fC~

PLEASE PRINT

2o/
20/ 0 -J-/3/t?
-).. I 3/t?

(If defendant is a minor, a form must also be completed
by parent or legal guardian)
APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER

~,AI £. /J1

Defendant's Name

t.(
L.(

R/C4
RIC4

Y
er

ILf
Ilf

Street Address

x'D,,
x'D

City

State

~I.5£
~I.5£

P.O. Box

3 3 ?o,?
?o'7

Zip Code

Driver's License Number
Home Phone

Work Phone

I, S, C,II
c.I I

Message Phone

Mailing Address (if different from above)
City

Birth Date(Month/DaylYear)

State

Zip Code

EMPLOYMENT

I,Afcl/J<.
I,AJcl/J<. CEIZI'l
c.EfZl'l TE b

W£ S T. 7/;,

Name of Current or Last Employer

Phone

IIEAt-TIt

-::>8 CIC..5
C/C..5 l:v<.I
I:v<.I
City

State

Zip Code

rAJ

End Date

Paid by the month

0

Time on the Job

hour 0

Hours Per Week

Rate of Pay $,_--,-_--,-_~-_
$,_--,-_--,-_~--

?3/-5~/- 5'00<::>
Phone

I

City

State

'3/Zcx?8
'3IZcx?,E
Begin Date

CA fZc.

Name of Spouse's Current or Last Employer

Begin Date

,.End Date

Paid by the month

0

hour

Zip Code

4"0
4' 0

4 'M
£.t·
u £

Time~n the Job

gr..
gr--

Hours Per week

$_2_~_2_-L
2:3 2'£-

_

Rate of Pay $

-----:-,-----,------ - - - - - - - - - - $ - - - - - - - ' - - -----,-,-----,-----Date Unemployment
Benefits Began
(or will begin)

Date Unemployment
Benefits Terminate

Monthly Unempl. (or
(anticipated income)

FINANCIAL
No. Children You Are Supporting

L

Child Support Current? YesD No

0

Monthly Support $

..>:;-0

Amount in Arrears $ _ _ _ __

--,-_ _ __
No. Children Living With You _ _ Ages _ _ _ _--,No. Adults Living With You __ Relationships _ _ _ _ _ __

ASSETS
Rent

~'OwnD
~'OwnD

Your Home
/

Equity in Home

SiJou sC:
SfJou

U;u >£-r-rt.£b
>£-r-rt.£))
UIIJ

'Jp;1/.;:JLG£
'!J:x;V.;:JLG£,
P~Pe:tz.7'1
P~Pe:tz.7'1
5

$

Equity in Other Land or Property

$

a<J

0

Mortgage Loan Balance

$ , - - - - -

Property Loan Balance

$

Vehicle Loan Balance

~bOb
~bOb
$,--+••_ - 

_

e

..>7;0
->7;0 00

0

Year and Make of Vehicle(s) _ _ _ _ _ __
Equity in Vehicle(s)

"3 9;.000
"39;000

$

b

~

$,--+,,---

C4

Cash on Hand

:f~ (,itA1£'!:>
c,tUJ£'!:>

r

Cash in Checking Accounts
"'
"'NameofBank_,----~U~>~~~~~~~/_{
__
Name
of Bank _,--------'U:...::....->----'tJ,=-.:...:~::....~-'I_t._ _ __
Cash in Savings Accounts
$
NameofBank
___
Name of Bank _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Other Assets _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER·
DEFENDER - 1

~-it
~-it

(, ?c:.o
$$

Checking Acct. No. _ _ _ _ _S'_Cf_o_<t
!:S'_Cf_o_<t

6

D
$ , - - - - -

Savings Acct. No., _ _ _ _ _ _ __

L'
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, 1l/J/fft-!1J>Le
All1ft1,,11 J>Le

, 6 /'1£,
/'1 £,

,6

tV

Dr r-n
'7
/?7 'I

f 1/
IIlta£5/
lta£5/

4f::: r 1-1

$vL.J r?
11 $vLr

III C
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--i-/tFoe/71J1T~,,,,J
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~ 0 .Ao(
.Ai 0 '( «.Effl-€SEfi(
«.Ef fl-€SE/II'(
(H
r S --i-It
F(fl/71 J1 T~,,,,J {
ro
l..E

/~I
/ ~I

0/11£ ;..I £ut/~R£
£l/tI~R£ [}
J) PEllJ£r-J T /f CG"fl./f '1"£,
-r£, ~~
~.-47..
£ '>TI/VIyt T£ S-5"
HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY INCOME

Continued on Reverse

HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY DEBTS

0=- __
$,_~---=O='

Your Wages (Take-home, Before Garnishments)

$,_~--==-_ _

Spouse's Wages (Take-home)

'3:01:>0
$,_....::·3::::;./L...::o:::.....::t>:...:o~_
$,_....:::::;.L...:::::....::~_

Other Household Member Wages

$,
_ _~:::.....
_
$,_
~c0:::...._
__

,

a

C!)d

Car Payment

$$

""3LfS--""3 Ltg --

Food

$$

yoo-

Utilities

15"'0 ..$
$,-----,---":"7:'"

0 0

0 0

"7$
"'7$

A.F.D.C.

~
"!:!
~OD
$$,-----""~'---O-D_-_=C!l7'rd

Rent or Mortgage Paid By You

'-----

ct>
at>

2 00 . -;2..

Social Security

$,_
00=-__
$
, -_
-=---

Transportation

$$

5.5.1.
S.S.I. I 5.5.0.
S.S.D.

$,

0
_
$,-----

Auto Insurance

D$,_
_(
'7-->--.;(:)=--_
$

Unemployment Insurance

$_ _....:::0:::..-_
b
$-----.::==----

Day Care

$,$

0_ _

Veterans Benefits

$_ _0
0=-__
$---===---

Educational Loans

$

0
0....::...-_

Retirement/Pension

$,_ _=0
0__
$,---=---

Credit Cards

$

5

Child Support/Alimony

$$_
__
_...J....<:~_
.1..0:::.....-_
0

Medical

$$

(":;-0("";-0

Other

0 __
$._~O=--

Child~
Child~

$

,,<:0>
0"0>

CJD
cD

$._--=----

Court Fines

...

Total Monthly Income

$

Other
Other

~

3,QO()
;

·~O...::...____

'I(

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

D

$4:'--,

~

'? 7- 

--=-

~

>9/ 0 0 0 M0.:>00

""3,000

_

~ ~ ~ I, f1..J;

~ ~ ~.,.~
.

Name

Phone

Phone

City

Zip Code

State

Dtts

$
$
7·•
7
$_ _--=-___
$_

....

J

Who will assist you financially?

If you are under legal age, who is your parent or guardian?

City

$$

~ 1'3,

~

S::S-D 
S5'"D
"'"C
I,Zoo
I, 200

;:t;:ti:f 4~
;:t;::ti:f

Total Monthly Dtts

$__
Amount of money remaining at the end of each month $
__·~O...::...____

Name

00

DO 
-QZl

State

Zip Code

)
) ss.
)

I am requesting that a lawyer be appointed to represent me, and I understand that I may be required to reimburse the public defender at the end
of my case. I swe under penalty of perjury that the answers above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

~~~';I---,q...:.~~~----~~~~~~~~----------
Applic

Date

\z....
-..X!~uiifl,JVI
-..X!~uiifl,JVI .-

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on

........--."'1

,,..\
..\ N
......
""
S'liJ/~"~
,..:\.~ S1iJ
/~ .~
..... ~
~I
~1

~
f,... ,. •l· ~or
........,.., .....~ ~S
-. J.. ..

$'

•••

....
~

~

~1I
~lJ
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By
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1 8 2012
JAN 18
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By TARA THERRIEN
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY MURRAY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent -Respondent.
Respondent-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310

ORDER APPOINTING
ST ATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
STATE
DEFENDER AND ALLOWING
PETITIONER TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

The Court, having considered the Petitioner's Motion for the Appointment of the State
Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and good cause appearing, HEREBY
APPOINTS the State Appellate Public Defender to represent Mr. Murray on appeal from the
final judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief.
IT IS HEREBY ALSO ORDERED that the Petitioner be allowed to proceed In Forma
Pauperis, as he has prev~0.t~een fo
DATED

d

thiSjL~---r-V-"~Lf----/H;,L
thiSjL~""'"T-v--"'~'---f----Hf;'"

'il.UD-<"""

r

District Judge

I ··
1

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND
ALLOWING PETITIONER TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
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NO'---:;=;:--~-ar~_ _ __
NO.----:~~__;:;~---
A.M·
-1P.M
A.M·
__
_ _ _FILED
-IP.M_ _ _ ___
8:00

TO:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 334-2616

MAR 15 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
OEPUTY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
x Docket No. 39400-2011
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

x

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 1BB PAGES LODGED

Appealed from the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge.
This transcript contains hearing held on:
May 31, 2011

DATE:

February 14, 2012

~ourt
~ourt

Reporter

Official Court Reporter,
Judge Deborah Bail
Ada County Courthouse
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18
Registered Merit Reporter
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 39400
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Transcript of Hearing Held July 13,2009 & September 8, 2009, Boise, Idaho, filed
November 17,2010.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 15th day of March, 2012.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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•
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i

IN TIffi DISTRICT COURT OF TIffi FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIffi
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
May 31,2011

Deborah Bail / T. Therrien
District Judge Clerk

JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
EXHIBIT LIST

Petitioner,

vS.

Case No. CVPCI0-21310

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING
POST-CONVICTION

Petitioner's Counsel:
Dennis Benj~n
ATTORNEY AT LAW

Respondent's Counsel:
Tessie Buttram
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

BY
Petitioner

NO.
1

DESCRIPTION
STATUS
Copy of Guilty Plea Advisory Admitted

DATE
5/31/11

Petitioner

2

Copy of Transcript

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

3

Copy of Evaluation

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

4

Copy of Evaluation

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

5

Copy of Letter

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

6

Copy of Cell Phone Bill

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

7

Copy of Cell Phone Bill

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

8

Copy of Cell Phone Bill

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

9

Copy of Affd. of Complaint Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

10

Copy of Cell Phone Bill

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

11

Copy of Letter

Admitted

5/31/11

Petitioner

12

Copy of Affidavit

Admitted

5/31/11

Copy of Email

Admitted

5/31/11

Respondent· A

\"
Exhibit List Page 1 of 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
MURRA Y,
Supreme Court Case No. 39400
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk ofthe District Court

I
Date of Service:

MAR 15 2012
--------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 39400
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
18th day of November, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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